The path towards clear and convincing digital privacy rights by Greene, Frederick V
Purdue University
Purdue e-Pubs
Open Access Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
8-2016




Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Organizational Behavior and Theory
Commons
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.
Recommended Citation
Greene, Frederick V., "The path towards clear and convincing digital privacy rights" (2016). Open Access Dissertations. 765.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations/765
Graduate School Form 




This is to certify that the thesis/dissertation prepared 
By  
Entitled 
For the degree of 
Is approved by the final examining committee: 
To the best of my knowledge and as understood by the student in the Thesis/Dissertation  
Agreement, Publication Delay, and Certification Disclaimer (Graduate School Form 32), 
this thesis/dissertation adheres to the provisions of Purdue University’s “Policy of  
Integrity in Research” and the use of copyright material. 
Approved by Major Professor(s): 
Approved by: 
   Head of the Departmental Graduate Program     Date 
Frederick V. Green
The Path Towards Clear and Convincing Digital Privacy Rights










 THE PATH TOWARDS CLEAR AND 








Frederick V. Greene 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree  
of 









To my daughters, Brittany, Tiffany, Melody, and Chelsey, for their love and support. 
Remember Matthew 19:26 when “Jesus looked at them and said, ‘With man this is 
impossible, but with God all things are possible.” To my mom, Mrs. Estella Greene for 
her continuous love, support, guidance and insistence on educational excellence. To Dr. 
Linda Naimi for her excellence, steadfastness, and continued support. In memory of my 
deceased father, Dr. Alfonzo Greene, for his lifelong belief in the importance of 






I would like to thank Dr. Linda Naimi for her dedicated support and direction. Dr. Naimi 
has to rank amongst the top nationally in her quality leadership as an advisor, as well as 
her exceptional breadth and depth of knowledge in most areas of inquiry. To the other 
members of my committee who have guided me in this endeavor, including Dr. Michael 
T. Harris, Dr. James Mohler, and Dr. Jon Padfield.  In special memory of Professor Bruce 
A. Harding and in memory of my mentor and friend Dr. Joseph Warren. To my siblings 
Dr. Alfonzo Greene, Jr., Dr. Anthony Greene and Crystal Greene Thomas, and Dr. Leon 
Thomas for believing I could accomplish this project and continuous encouragement, and 
prayer. To my many students over the years that have inspired me to continue down the 
road of academia. And to my Heavenly Father for demonstrating repeatedly that “…we 
know that in all things God works for the good of those who love him, who have been 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Page 
 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii 
GLOSSSARY .................................................................................................................... ix 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... xii 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Statement Of The Problem...................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Research Questions ................................................................................................. 2 
1.3 Significance Of The Problem.................................................................................. 2 
1.4 Statement Of The Purpose ...................................................................................... 4 
1.5 Assumptions ............................................................................................................ 6 
1.6 Limitations .............................................................................................................. 6 
1.7 Delimitations ........................................................................................................... 7 
1.8 Summary ................................................................................................................. 8 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................ 9 
2.1 The Fourth Amendment .......................................................................................... 9 
2.2 A Right To Privacy ............................................................................................... 11 
2.3 Electronic Surveillance ......................................................................................... 13 
2. 4 The Wiretap Act And The Super Warrant ........................................................... 15 
2.5 In The Case Of Email ........................................................................................... 17 
2.6 The Push For Reform ............................................................................................ 19 
2.7 In The Case Of The Iphone ................................................................................... 19 





2.9 Digital Due Process Coalition ............................................................................... 23 
2.10 The Case Of Edward Snowden ........................................................................... 26 
2.11 Summary ............................................................................................................. 27 
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY .................................................................................... 29 
3.1 Legal Inquiries ...................................................................................................... 29 
3.2 Research Design.................................................................................................... 30 
3.3 Process And Procedures ........................................................................................ 31 
3.4 Summary ............................................................................................................... 34 
CHAPTER 4. PRESENTATION OF THE DATA........................................................... 35 
4.1 Analysis Of Case Law .......................................................................................... 35 
4.2 Relevant Legislation ............................................................................................. 36 
4.3 A Comparison Of Relevant Cases ........................................................................ 36 
4.4 In The Matter Of Probable Cause And The Right To Privacy ............................. 51 
4.5 The Doctrine Of Clear And Convincing ............................................................... 57 
CHAPTER 5. FINDINGS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ................................... 60 
5.1 Findings .................................................................................................................. 61 
5.2 Discussion .............................................................................................................. 69 
5.2.1 Origins Of American Intellectual Property Law ........................................... 69 
5.2.2 Applicability Of The Legislation .................................................................. 75 
5.2.3 Patent Law History ........................................................................................ 82 
5.2.4 Alternative Theories Pertaining To The Origins Of Intellectual Property 
Law  ..................................................................................................... 84 
5.2.5 Other Theories Of Law .................................................................................. 86 
5.2.6 The Absence Of Criminal Sanctions For Patent Violations .......................... 91 
5.2.7 The Relationship Between The Protection Of Electronic Communication And 
Protection Of Digital Or Electronic Intellectual Property Rights ................. 99 





LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................ 108 










Figure 4.1 Distribution of ECPA Cases by Level of Impact ............................................ 46 
Figure 4.2 ECPA Cases by Federal Appellate Circuit and Level of Impact .................... 46 
Figure 4.3 ECPA Cases by Circuit Court that Expand or Limit  
Digital Privacy Rights ........................................................................................... 47 
Figure 4.4 The Proportion of Cases that Expand or Limit Digital Privacy 
Right ..................................................................................................................... .48 




Cellular Phone or Cellphone—A portable telephone that uses wireless cellular 
technology to send and receive phone signals. (dictionary.reference.com) 
Cloud Computing-- Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand 
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., 
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction. (nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/) 
Electronic Communication—means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, 
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a 
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system that affects 
interstate or foreign commerce…(Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986, 18 USC 119). 
Electronic Communications System—means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo-
optical or photo electronic facilities for the transmission of electronic 
communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for 
the electronic storage of such communications. (Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986, 18 USC 119). 





GPS—Global Positioning System: a navigational system involving satellites and 
computers that can determine the latitude and longitude of a receiver on Earth by 
computing the time difference for signals from different satellites to reach the 
receiver (wordnetweb.princeton.edu). 
Internet—The internet is the single, interconnected, worldwide system of commercial, 
governmental, educational, and other computer networks that share (a) the 
protocol suite specified by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), and (b) the 
name and address spaces manages by the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN). (nist.gov/publications) 
Internet Protocol (IP)—Standard protocol for transmission of data from source to 
destinations in packet-switched communications networks and interconnected 
systems of such networks. (nist.gov/publications) 
Oral Communication—means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an 
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under 
circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any 






Wire Communication—means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use 
of facilities for the transmission of communication by the aid of wire, cable, or 
other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception 
(including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated 
by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the 
transmission of interstate or foreign communications for communications 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes any electronic 
storage of such communications. (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986, 18 USC 119). 
Wireless Technology—Technology that permits the transfer of information between 
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This study was a legal based inquiry to determine to what extend digital privacy rights 
are adequately protected by existing law. Because the major statutory vehicle that guides 
privacy rights in America was passed in 1986, the courts have had to address issues not 
contemplated by the statute. This study reviews the rulings of all twelve United States 
Courts of Appeal to determine whether or not digital privacy rights are expanded or 
limited. Comparisons are made between various circuits and different regions of the 
country. Three questions are addressed in this study, summarized as; a question about the 
current status of digital privacy laws; a question about the impact of court decisions on 
digital privacy rights; and a question and assessment about the adequacy of digital 
privacy laws. Also, recommendations are suggested for how digital privacy rights can be 
enhanced in the future. These recommendations would first change the standard needed 
to issue warrants and to access an individuals’ digital privacy rights to a “clear and 
convincing” analysis and standard. Secondly, the author recommends that digital privacy 
rights should become analogous to intellectual property rights and should have the same 
level of protection afforded intellectual property rights. Although digital privacy is not 
yet firmly recognized as more akin to Intellectual Property deserving of heightened 
protection, this study recommends that digital privacy, along with trade secret, copyright 
and patents, and trademark law should all be considered a type of intellectual capital that 




1.1 Statement of the Problem 
The world has progressed to the point that, digital and electronic communications 
have evolved exponentially since the passage of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986.  In 1986, the internet was in its infancy. Although, email existed it was not 
generally available or used by the public, and was the exclusive province of geeks and 
nerds. Mobile technology barely existed and had extremely limited functionality, totally 
unlike today where the average 12 -year old caries a Smartphone. Social Networking had 
an entirely different meaning related to personal in-person relationships—clearly not the 
internet phenomena known as social networking today, where individuals might stay in 
close touch with someone else a continent or two away. “Cloud computing” was two 
words not typically found in the same sentence. In the ensuing years since 1986, digital 
communications have exploded. It is quite astounding to see the vast amounts of data and 
information available online. Along with that tremendous expansion, we have seen the 
rise of internet banking, ecommerce, and online shopping, accompanied by a rising wave 
of internet crime and intrusions into personal privacy. Private citizens have become 
increasingly concerned about their digital privacy. Incursions have intruded from 
government entities to corporate entities and other members of the private sector. 
Today, courts disagree on what the constitutional protections may be relative to 
electronic communications and surveillance.  United States Circuit Courts have split on 
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the question as to what sort of protections exist from police intrusion into 
communications as well as electronic surveillance of movement.  Additionally, private 
corporations and other entities have unprecedented access to information that at one time 
was private. Historically, the courts have used a fourth amendment analysis to determine 
what rights and privileges should be afforded to citizens regarding their digital privacy. 
Many modern scenarios present questions implicating how fourth amendment protections 
will be analyzed and implemented. The current statute appears to “miss the mark” when 
it comes to protecting against the type of intrusions and violations of personal privacy 
that exist with present technology.  
 
1.2 Research Questions  
The questions guiding this research are: 
1. What is the current status of digital privacy laws in the United States? 
2. How have judicial decisions affected the digital privacy rights of citizens 
since 1986? 
3. Do current laws adequately protect the digital  privacy rights of citizens?  
 
1.3 Significance of the Problem 
The world has changed significantly in the past twenty plus years. In that short 
timeframe electronic communications have blossomed in a multitude of ways. Twenty 
years ago, very few people knew of the existence of the internet, cell phones, email, GPS, 
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Social Networking, or cloud computing. Today these terms and technologies are an 
everyday part of most American’s lives.  Twenty-five years ago, Congress passed the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. This statute has only been revised in a 
few minor ways since its passage.  The basic statute still exists as it did when enacted. 
The courts have heard and decided numerous cases and decisions concerning the above 
technologies without the benefit of new Congressional guidance as to how digital privacy 
rights should be weighed, analyzed and protected. Many decisions from various courts 
contradict decisions from other courts. Although the courts have used a Fourth 
Amendment framework to analyze digital privacy rights, the question remains as to how 
best those rights can be protected. The United States Supreme Court has weighed in on 
only a few sparse cases, and there is significant controversy as to what rights are 
protected versus which rights are not. This study attempts to create a roadmap to showing 
the various conclusions that different courts have reached regarding the same 
constitutional rights, and providing an analysis of the impact these decisions have on the 
body of law affecting these new technologies.  
This study was originally conceived to provide an accurate assessment of the 
inconsistencies and contradictions present in the case made rule of law regarding the 
impact of these new technologies on digital and electronic privacy rights.  After a 
thorough assessment on the present state of affairs it became clear that while the original 
questions needed to be addressed, the ultimate direction of the dissertation needed to 
change. A pattern emerged that clearly shows the relevant choices various courts have 
made in applying constitutional principles to electronic and digital issues before the 
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courts. The pattern that emerged showed that in the thirty (30) years since passage if the 
ECPA, the world had changed drastically.  
Digital and electronic communications have become the paramount and 
ubiquitous manner of communication worldwide. The importance and significance of 
digital communications presents an entirely new challenge that could not have been 
envisioned in past eras – the issue of digital privacy rights. The need for serious digital 
privacy rights protection far outstripped the need in years past. Simultaneously, society 
recognized that terrorism presented a real threat to the peace and security Americans 
want and enjoy. After the dreadful events on September 11, 2001, Congress immediately 
passed the Patriot Act that increased law enforcement’s ability to snoop, spy, and track 
any person’s electronic and digital communications. In the aftermath of that massive 
expansion of surveillance rights, US citizens have been left with a weakened or non-
existent level of protection in digital and electronic communication.  
This study, recognizing the tenor of the times, evolved to present a theoretical 
analysis and frank assessment of the current state of affairs and future needs. To that 
extent, this research is transformative in its outlook, assessment, and prognosis. The 
changes recommended represent a complete paradigm shift in how the issue should be 
handled. 
 
1.4 Statement of the Purpose 
One general purpose of this research was to analyze the current status of digital 
and electronic privacy protection laws.  The analysis was intended to gauge the status of 
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protection afforded digital and electronic communications today with the protective 
levels of digital, electronic and non-electronic communications in bygone decades. 
Although the protection levels may be the same, and courts may be enforcing modern-
day electronic and digital communications privacy rights in a similar manner as 
communications in the past, the answer to the research question may still be –no, the 
United States does not adequately protect electronic and digital privacy rights with 
present laws and judicial rulings. 
 If various types of communication common today, in the expanded electronic 
world, do not enjoy the same level of protection that communications, electronic and 
non-electronic, had in the past, then the answer still indicates that the law has lagged 
behind the advancements in communications technology leaving electronic 
communication rights and associated data security rights vulnerable and unprotected. To 
answer the question in the affirmative, that is that digital and electronic privacy rights are 
adequately protected under the law would require an affirmative showing that nothing 
new has developed or happened since 1986 that requires that digital privacy deserves 
greater protection then in the past.  
This research, although not initially designed to do anything other than to explore 
the research questions at hand, evolved into a recommendation for a complete paradigm 
shift in the area of digital and electronic privacy rights. After assessing the current status 
of digital communication and the relative importance of the privacy needs in this greatly 
enhanced area of communication, the facts cried out for a robust solution. This research 
presents a number of paradigmatic shifts in how we view electronic and digital 
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communications and the value we should place on the process for protecting that 
communications and the digital privacy rights associated with our communication. 
 
1.5 Assumptions 
The following assumptions were inherent to the pursuit of this study: 
1. This study assumes that articulable factors exist in all cases evaluated that 
will allow the researcher to show the various results courts have reached in 
their judicial decisions. 
2. Individual and collective rights of privacy can be articulated in a manner 
that fairly represents the right sought to be protected in court proceedings. 
3. Courts make decisions based on a reasonably finite set of factors or 
variables that can be accurately determined in a discreet manner. 
4. An evaluation can meaningfully express the results of the court holdings 
and court decisions. 
5. The results of an evaluation study can and should provide relevant and 
appropriate information that allows reasonable inferences to be made 




The following limitations were inherent to the pursuit of this study: 
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1. The study was limited to relevant federal cases that cite the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) in its entirety and makes no 
assumptions about state cases or decisions, nor citations to laws or statutes 
that are subsets of the ECPA. 
2. The study was limited to that portion of cases that involve or implicate 
“digital privacy rights,” or “electronic privacy rights” as those terms are 
understood, and that cases that cite the act but fail to implicate digital 
privacy rights in any way will be eliminated from the study as irrelevant. 
3. The study was limited to actual cases filed and does not address disputes 




The following delimitations were inherent to the pursuit of this study: 
1. This study does not purport to answer every question or to analyze every factor 
relative to the privacy decisions.  
2. This study only analyzes the factors articulated in the study. 






This chapter provided an overview of the problem, purpose, and significance of 
the research. It presented research questions and discussed the underlying assumptions, 
limitations, and delimitations of the study. 
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2.1 The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (US Constitution, Fourth 
Amendment). 
The purview of what it means to be “secure” has been the subject of numerous 
court cases. Almost every word in the Fourth Amendment has been the subject of some 
form of litigation over the past 200 years. One of those words that have been litigated is 
the word “warrant.”  It is important to understand what the Fourth Amendment was 
designed to protect. According to Taylor, 2001, the “chief evil that the Fourth 
Amendment was intended to address was the issuance of warrants that were 
inappropriately general in nature. To that end, the proscription of ‘unreasonable searches 
and seizures’ was a reference to illegally general warrants, and not an independent 
standard governing searches and seizures” (Taylor, 2001, p.9). 
10 
The US Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue as to the sufficiency of a 
warrant authorizing law enforcement to seize items from a person’s home. In Stanford v. 
Texas, The US Supreme Court (1965) stated: 
We need not decide in the present case whether the description of the things to be 
seized would have been too generalized to pass constitutional muster, had the 
things been weapons, narcotics, or cases of whiskey. . . . The point is that it was 
not any contraband of that kind which was ordered to be seized, but literary 
material – “books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, 
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of 
Texas, and the operations of the Communist Party in Texas.” The indiscriminate 
sweep of that language is constitutionally intolerable. To hold otherwise would be 
false to the terms of the Fourth Amendment, false to its meaning, and false to its 
history (Taylor, 2001, p. 10, quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 US 476). 
The Supreme Court went on in later cases to find that “reasonable expectations of 
privacy” provides the standard whereby it can be judged whether or not a person can be 
free from a warrantless search. The court discusses this idea in the case of Smith v. 
Maryland in which the court indicates that: 
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz's two-pronged inquiry would 
provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection. For example, if the 
Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes 
henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not 
in fact entertain any actual expectation or privacy regarding their homes, papers, 
and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this 
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Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously monitoring 
his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the 
contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances, where an 
individual's subjective expectations had been “conditioned” by influences alien to 
well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations 
obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection was. In determining whether a “legitimate expectation of 
privacy” existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper (Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 US 735 [1979] as quoted by Taylor, 2001, p. 12). 
 
2.2 A Right to Privacy 
The US Supreme Court very early on recognized that for the right to be “secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects” to be effective, there naturally must occur a 
right to “privacy.” Although the word privacy cannot be found in the United States 
Constitution, its presence can be found in numerous cases. The Supreme Court has 
indicated that the Right to Privacy is within the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights 
(Oyama, 2006). Privacy has been defined in many ways, but it generally is “the right to 
be left alone.” It is considered an individual, personal right (Lasprogata, King, & Pillay, 
2004). 
The right to privacy in many ways is like personal property that can be traded 
away or bargained away. In the absence of willingly trading or bargaining away the right, 
it is considered an enforceable right against others that would violate that right 
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(Lasprogata, King, & Pillay, 2004). The first cases that dealt with this right of privacy 
were not in an electronic context but in cases involving the United States mail. These 
cases, long before federal law was passed regarding electronic communication, addressed 
privacy rights in mail delivered by the US Post Office. The concept of privacy as it 
relates to mail was first promulgated in a US Supreme Court case called Ex Parte Jackson 
as early as 1877 (Pikowsky, 2003). Ex Parte Jackson (96 US at 727) held that: 
[A] distinction is to be made between different kinds of mail matter, between 
what is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and sealed 
packages subject to letter postage; and what is open to inspection, such as 
newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter, purposely left in a 
condition to be examined. Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are 
as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form 
and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own 
domiciles.  
The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers 
against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed 
against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be 
opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are 
subjected to search in one's own household. No law of Congress can place in the 
hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade the 
secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations 
adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great  
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principle embodied in the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Pikowsky, 
2003, p. 7; quoting Ex Parte Jackson, (1877). 
Later cases dealing with postal mail generally have held that there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the mail that requires a warrant for a package or letter to be 
opened by law enforcement. In the case of United States v. Van Leeuwen, the United 
States Supreme Court upheld statutory provisions Congress passed that codified 
protection of the United States Mail from warrantless searches (Pikowsky, 2003). 
 
2.3 Electronic Surveillance  
The first case that ever dealt with the issue of electronic surveillance was decided 
by the US Supreme Court in 1928 in the case of Olmstead v. United States (Horn, 2002). 
This case was decided almost 50 years after the telephone was invented by Alexander 
Graham Bell. Unfortunately, the case held that warrantless wiretaps of telephones were 
not a violation Fourth Amendment rights (Horn, 2002). This interpretation ultimately led 
to an act of Congress to curtail the warrantless wiretapping of telephones.  
The Communications Act of 1934 said that “no person not being authorized by 
the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, 
contents, substance, purpose, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to 
any person” (Horn, 2002). Federal agencies routinely got around this congressionally 
mandated prohibition by claiming that the statute required two acts to become applicable; 
namely interception and divulgence. Federal agencies made it a point to indicate that they 
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were only intercepting not divulging the information, so the act should not apply to their 
activities. 
 Ironically, Justice Brandeis dissented in the Olmstead case and provided what is 
considered to be one of the most visionary quotes from the bench nearly 70 years ahead 
of its time. Brandeis’ dissent said; 
Ways may someday be developed by which the Government, without removing 
papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be 
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.... Can it be 
that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual 
security” (Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 1928, p. 474) 
The practice of ignoring a warrant requirement continued until 1937 when the 
Supreme Court indicated that the Wiretap Act prevented federal agencies from 
warrantless wiretaps even without their divulgence of the information (Horn, 2002). 
Two more US Supreme Court decisions in the next decade played a major role in 
defining the rights that individuals had in electronic telecommunications. Berger v. New 
York, and Katz v. United States. The Berger decision struck down a New York statute 
that authorized governmental warrantless wiretapping. The court noted that conversations 
are protected under the US Constitution, and that seizure of these conversations amounts 
to a search (Horn, 2002). 
The Katz decision affirmatively held that law enforcement had to obtain a search 
warrant based upon the usual probable cause standard to monitor telephone calls placed 
from a telephone booth (Oyama, 2006). These decisions were tempered by a later 
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decision in United States v. Miller that held that these privacy rights did not exist where 
the contents of a private communication is revealed to third parties (Oyama, 2006). 
 
2. 4 The Wiretap Act and the Super Warrant 
Much of what the Supreme Court decided in Berger and Katz was ultimately 
codified into law with the 1968 passage of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act. Certain provisions of this legislation are commonly referred to as the 
Wiretap Act (Mulligan, 2004). The various provisions of this act are succinctly 
summarized by Mulligan, 2004: 
First, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title 
III”), creating a statutory right of privacy in oral and wire communications, 
predated the advent of electronic communications. Written in 1968, the statute 
was directed at the “aural acquisition” of voice communications that passed, at 
least in part, over a wire. The wiretap provisions of Title III authorized law 
enforcement wiretapping of telephones within a framework designed to protect 
privacy and compensate for the uniquely intrusive aspects of electronic 
surveillance. Title III requires law enforcement to obtain what has been referred 
to as a “superwarrant” before intercepting phone conversations. While 
instinctually individuals using e-mail may have expected protections against 
interception to extend to this new means of communicating, courts had found that 
a literal reading of the statute did not provide protection.  Electronic mail and data 
are not “oral” communications, nor are they subject to “aural” acquisition. Any 
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prohibition on intercepting electronic communications would thus have to be 
based on the Fourth Amendment itself (Mulligan, 2004, p. 1561). 
Notwithstanding the prohibition of warrantless searches by law enforcement, J. 
Edgar Hoover routinely ordered federal agents of the FBI to conduct these warrantless 
searches throughout his tenure at the FBI from 1924-1972 (Horn, 2002). 
Later as more and more people became involved with electronic communication, 
the need for additional statutory protection was apparent to Congress. In 1986 Congress 
adopted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). Although adopted at a time 
when electronic communications was growing, this act still preceded the explosive 
growth of the internet. As McDonough (2007) points out, “The words ‘Internet’, ‘World 
Wide Web,’ and ‘e-commerce’ appear in neither the ECPA nor its legislative history.” In 
effect the ECPA amends the wiretap act and makes many of the earlier provisions 
applicable to electronic communications. The ECPA is divided into three different areas 
as explained by Mulligan, 2004: 
[T]he Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2522; the Pen Register statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3121-3127; and the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2711. The Wiretap Act and Pen Register statute regulate prospective surveillance 
of Internet communications (communications “in transit”), and the SCA governs 
retrospective surveillance (stored communications). Each of the titles operate in 
the same basic way generally prohibiting unauthorized access to communications 
and other personal information, but permitting specified exemptions, one of which 
provides the government with the ability to obtain direct access or to compel a 
third party to turn over information (Mulligan, 2004, p. 1565). 
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2.5 In the Case of Email 
Each of the provisions of the Wiretap Act, The Pen Register statute, and The 
Stored Communications Act (SCA) have different provisions for enforcement and 
interpretation. This has allowed for different levels of protection for electronic 
communications depending on where it is in the transmission chain. Emails, for example, 
are subject to different regulations depending on whether or not they have been sent, 
opened, unopened, viewed and/or stored (Albrecht,2003). It is important to note that 
analogies about email are not based on express mention of the term “email” in the ECPA. 
In 1986 when the ECPA was adopted, email was in its infancy and not considered 
something in need of statutory protection in and of itself. Dombrow (1998) cites a 1995 
Dunn and Bradstreet study that shows: 
While e-mail in the workplace continues to grow, its use by businesses is not a 
new phenomenon. In a 1995 survey of 272 small to mid-size businesses, fifty-six 
percent reported use of e-mail within the company, forty-one percent exchanged 
e-mail with off site employees, twenty-three percent exchanged e-mail with 
suppliers, and eighteen percent exchanged e-mail with business advisors. These 
companies also reported thirty-eight percent as having regularly telecommuting 
employees. Already in 1995, eighty-seven percent of the Fortune 100 companies 
reported using e-mail for person to person messaging (Dombrow, 1998, p.695). 
 
This 1995 study was conducted some nine years after the 1986 act (ECPA) was 
passed. At that time the vast majority of email usage was intra-company with only 23% 
of companies in the survey exchanging email with non-company entities. In 1986, email 
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was not on the radar screen of Congress. The word email is not even mentioned in the 
ECPA (Dombrow, 1998). Other technologies in use today had not for the most part been 
invented or discovered as the case may be. Peer to Peer communications, Cloud 
Computing, social networks, The World Wide Web, and most of what has become 
common in everyday usage did not exist at the time of the ECPA’s adoption. The ECPA 
does provide three different methods for obtaining communication under the act. These 
three methods are; 1. The warrant, 2. The Administrative Subpoena, and 3. The National 
Security Letter (NSL). The use of NSL’s grew tremendously after 9/11 and the enactment 
of the USA Patriot Act (McNerney, 2010). 
Although the ECPA fails in many ways to protect the newer technologies, some 
courts have forged ahead with judicial protection. The U.S.  Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Ohio decided a case that generally upheld the idea of privacy protection for 
email: 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ultimately held that 
when a user does not expect a third party to access one's e-mail in the normal 
course of business, “the party maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy, and 
subpoenaing the entity with mere custody over the documents is insufficient to 
trump the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” On remand, the Court 
permitted  the government to seize private e-mails in electronic storage under the 
following circumstances: (1) by obtaining a search warrant under the Fourth 
Amendment; (2) by providing notice to the account holder when seeking a court 
order; or (3) by showing specific, articulable facts, demonstrating that the ISP or 
other entity has complete access to the e-mails in the normal course of its 
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business, which demonstrates that the user has waived any expectation of privacy 
(Wright, 2007-2008, pp.548-549, citing Warshak v US). 
 
2.6 The Push for Reform 
Various courts have issued opinions all over the board when it comes to the 
privacy protections afforded electronic communications. The uncertainty has led many 
groups to advocate for reform of the law by Congress. One such group advocating reform 
is called Digital Due Process (DDP). DDP is a “broad coalition of technology and 
communications companies, trade associations, advocacy groups, and think tanks, as well 
as academics and individual lawyers” (Comments of Digital Due Process, 2010). The 
coalition generally advocates that the warrant requirement apply for electronic searches. 
The DDP has six guiding principles: “Technology and Platform Neutrality…Assurance 
of Law Enforcement Access…Equality Between Transit and 
Storage…Consistency…Simplicity and Clarity…Recognition of All Existing 
Exceptions” (Comments of Digital Due Process, 2010). 
 
2.7 In the Case of the iPhone  
Apple has fought a number of cases relative to the desire of the federal 
government to force it to create a backdoor to the Apple iPhone. Although there have 
been past cases where Apple has cooperated with the government, there appears to be a 





One case in 2016, deals with the San Bernardino terrorist gunmen. These 
terrorists owned an Apple iPhone 5C. The Apple iPhone 5C has an encryption program 
that if a wrong password is entered into the phone ten successive times, all of the data on 
the phone will be destroyed. The FBI had attempted to break the password on nine 
occasions unsuccessfully (Retrieved from https://www.nbc.news.com/storyline/san-
bernardino-shooting/Apple-FBI-face-Congressional-hearing-encryption-N528841). They 
were concerned that if they tried one more time, all of the data they were trying to 




The FBI obtained a search warrant and court order against Apple to force Apple 
Computer to write a program that would disable the ten wrong password security feature. 
Apple continually refused. Apple indicated that to create such a program would 
compromise the security of all Apple iPhones. Their argument was that once this program 
existed, not only would there be no limit as to when it would be used, but also, other 
hackers and those who do not have a purported right to the information would be in a 
better position to disable the same feature that Apple had designed into the iPhone. The 
legal issues before the judge were actually quite complex. Not only are privacy and other 
constitutional issues involved, but statutory interpretation was also involved. Most 
amazingly, the FBI was relying on The “All Writs Act of 1789.” This 200+ year old act 
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was all the government could find to make a clear case. Apple CEO, Tim Cook, has 
indicated that the United States government “wants something we considered too 
dangerous to create.” Apple CEO, Tim Cook goes on to indicate “we have great respect 
for the professionals at the FBI, and we believe their intentions are good.” Up to this 
point, we have done everything that is both within our power and within the law to help 
them. But now the US government has asked us for something we simply do not have 
and something we considered too dangerous to create. They have asked us to build a 
backdoor to the iPhone.” 
In the past decade, it has become clear that privacy rights would become and have 
become one of the major concerns that most individuals should have regarding protecting 
their valuable personal information. A number of cases that have garnered publicity tells 
us how important privacy rights are to everyday Americans. 
 
2.8 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
Congress could not have conceived in 1986 when it passed the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) that was designed to regulate access by the 
government to electronic communications and records that the world of electronic 
communications would have grown to the dimensions that it has grown to today. The 
very assumptions that existed in 1986 are no longer applicable. The Internet was barely 
operational in 1986. Now a substantial part of commerce worldwide is conducted through 
the Internet.  
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Additionally, the idea of social media had not even been born yet. Social media 
now accounts for a huge percentage of traffic on the Internet. Congress could not have 
even understood that the world itself would shrink, metaphorically, when the ability to 
post something in the Middle East that could be instantly read in China that could be 
instantly commented on in North America. The idea that communications would be 
worldwide and instantaneous was more of a science fiction idea, than the reality that it 
has become. Some of the major flaws that Congress could not have foreseen came about, 
partly, because of the dramatic reduction in the cost of electronic storage.  
Many of you like me, may remember when storage was extremely expensive. My 
first computer in 1984 was a Kaypro II. Because of the prohibitive cost of storage and 
hard drives, my first computer did not even have a hard drive. The way you saved 
information was from 5 ¼ floppy disks to 5 ¼ floppy disks. Kaypro had two floppy disk 
drives specifically so that you could save information from one to the other. I recall my 
first IBM PC with an MS-DOS operating system which I purchased sometime in 1987. 
This first “Windows-based system” had a 40 MB hard drive. I now carry in my pocket a 
smart phone with a 64 GB storage capacity (1600 times more storage capability). A law 
that was written in 1986 when storage was at a premium, necessarily focused on real-time 
surveillance. The law heavily prohibits access to real-time data but is quite weak in 
enforcing access for stored records. The idea of stored records doesn’t even make sense 
today. Not only do we store things on our individual devices, but we have access to 
unlimited storage in the cloud. The idea that there should be a distinction, between the 
government or any other entity, having access to real-time information versus stored 
information is now nonsensical. Yet the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act is 
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heavily based on that distinction. Any new law, or any new protection has to recognize 
that privacy rights are not contingent upon the storage medium, but that privacy rights 
should be protected at a high level that would assure an absolute level of confidence that 
other entities or individuals that had no right to the information would not be able to 
access that information. 
2.9 Digital Due Process Coalition 
Some of the major proposals that exist today for fixing the problem related to lack 
of privacy protections in electronic communications, are promulgated by what is known 
as the Digital Due Process Coalition. This coalition, including many companies that are 
household names. Apple Computer, Facebook, Alphabet Inc. (the owner of Google), 
Amazon, Adobe, AOL, eBay, Hewlett Packard, Microsoft, as well as the American Civil 
Liberties Union, to name a few, are all a part of this coalition. This Digital Due Process 
Coalition (digitaldueprocess.org) has as a motto, “modernizing surveillance laws for the 
Internet age.” If you go to their website you can see that they have a comprehensive and 
extensive approach to updating privacy laws in the United States. They list as their 
guiding principle: 
To simplify, clarify, and unify the ECPA standards, providing stronger privacy 
protections for communications and associated data in response to changes in 
technology and new services and usage patterns, while preserving the legal tools 
necessary for government agencies to enforce the laws, respond to emergency 




The Digital Due Process Coalition promotes four major principles. They are as 
follows; 
1. The government should obtain a search warrant based on probable cause 
before it can compel a service provider to disclose a user’s private 
communications or documents stored online.  
2. The government should obtain a search warrant based on probable cause 
before it can track, prospectively or retrospectively, the location of a cell 
phone or other mobile communications device. 
3. Before obtaining transactional data in real time about when and with whom an 
individual communicates using email, instant messaging, text messaging, the 
telephone or any other communications technology, the government should 
demonstrate to a court that such data is relevant to an authorized criminal 
investigation. 
4. Before obtaining transactional data about multiple unidentified users of 
communications or other online services when trying to track down a suspect, 
the government should first demonstrate to a court that the data is needed for 
its criminal investigation. (Retrieved from 
http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=99629E40-2551-11DF-
8E02000C296BA163). 
While these four major principles are certainly a step forward from the antiquated 
and nonexistent coverage now afforded by the ECPA, it really only involves tinkering at 
the edges. The idea that our electronic privacy should be held hostage to mere notions of 
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“Probable Cause” that judges can ascertain based upon the flimsiest of evidence, really 
does not provide adequate protection of Americans privacy rights. To properly analyze 
this idea, we must go back to the United States Constitution and try to understand what 
exactly the fourth amendment was designed to protect. When the Bill of Rights was 
passed by Congress in 1794 and ratified in 1795, the ideas embodied in the fourth 
amendment had a particular meaning. The fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. …… (https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fourth_amendment).  
 The Fourth Amendment was adopted to protect Americans from physical 
violations and physical incursions. The founding fathers obviously had no reason to think 
in terms of protection of electronic or digital privacy rights. Physical incursions are by 
nature, limited in scope and breadth. Limitations on manpower alone conceivably would 
limit the scope of a search or seizure. Certainly a massive army could execute a large 
scale search or seizure, but this necessitates tremendous resources and effort. Electronic 
communications, on the other hand, can be accessed with digital equipment that allows 
for the massive accumulation of all sorts of data and information, including sensitive 
digital privacy information. 
26 
 
2.10 The Case of Edward Snowden 
Edward Snowden was a former Central intelligence agency employee and a 
former US government subcontractor who copied and intentionally leaked classified 
government information from the national security agency in 2013. After leaking this 
information, Edward Snowden was forced to flee the United States and to seek asylum in 
other countries. Ultimately, he ended up in Russia. Edward Snowden received help from 
a number of whistleblower organizations including the Government Accountability 
Project (GAP). GAP is a nonprofit organization that supports whistleblower activity, and 
is a nonprofit organization that has been around since 1977 (Retrieved from 
https://info.whistleblower.org). 
A number of organizations including the Washington Post, and the Guardian 
published many of the disclosures that were leaked by Snowden. (The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/edward-snowden; BBC News, Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-22837100).  In June 2013 the United States 
Department of Justice brought charges against Snowden. These charges include theft of 
US government or foreign government property; and violation of the espionage act of 
1917, 
The author takes no position as to the propriety or impropriety of Snowden’s 
actions. What is important for purposes of this dissertation is that we now know with 
certainty that the National Security Agency (NSA), as well as many other government 
agencies, are involved in a massive collection of private data, from not only citizens, and 
businesses, but also from various governments. We learned from the Edward Snowden 
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disclosures that this amassing of information is unbelievably large in breadth and depth. 
The question that arises, is to what extent should private data be protected from 
government surveillance? Should the government be able to amass any amount of 
information and intercept any communications that they wish to amass from US citizens 
and others?  
The Edward Snowden case demonstrates that no one is outside of the reach of 
government data collection activities. The question before us today—is should the 
government be able to collect this massive information unencumbered? The vast majority 
of the information collected by the NSA is not collected pursuant to any sort of specific 
warrant for information. There appears to be an ongoing program of data collection not in 
any way tied to the need to obtain probable cause warrants. This massive collection of 
data is a clear violation of the privacy rights of millions of Americans. Many would argue 
that the government has to be able to collect this data to keep us safe. This is a false 
argument. Terrorism exists in totalitarian countries as well as free societies. Americans 
should not have to give up their privacy rights to remain safe.  
 
2.11 Summary 
This chapter explored the evolution of case law and legislation dealing with 
protection of personal information and rights to privacy in the digital age. Prior to the 
1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) there were numerous laws that 
protected some of the earlier communications devices like telephones, telegraph, and 
facsimile. The court always utilized the standard used in the Fourth Amendment to the 
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US Constitution of “Probable Cause” to determine the parameters of privacy rights and 
their protection from government intrusion. The world has changed rapidly since 1986. 
Because we now live in a digital environment, the idea of privacy has grown 
exponentially in significance. The 12-year old child at school needs protection from those 
that may attempt to do her harm by befriending her online first. The Snowden case, and 
data breaches at numerous retail establishments have made it transparently clear that 




This analytical study investigated the question as to whether or not the United 
States’ laws adequately protect digital and electronic communications privacy rights.  
This inquiry is by nature a legal inquiry. Legal inquiries are quite different than most 
types of inquiries in technology, science and/or the social sciences. Legal inquiries have 
typically focused on case results from the courts in a sequential manner, when the 
researcher is evaluating cases that may have established precedent on a particular topic.  
Each case is dissected based on the particular fact pattern, and an analysis is conducted as 
to how the court ruled and why. Legal researchers have also used various other research 
methods including the analysis of statutes, laws and ordinances. This study by nature is a 
qualitative study that attempts to shed light and information on the laws as they exist, 
namely the ECPA, and what has been done to adapt or change, limit or expand the impact 
of these laws to address the factually specific contingencies that could not have been 
foreseen at the time of passage. 
 
3.1 Legal Inquiries 
 There are a number of methodologies for conceptualizing how legal research is 
presented. One of the most famous methodologies for analyzing a court opinion is called 
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“IRAC.” IRAC is an acronym for “Issue, Rule, Analysis, and Conclusion.” This approach 
calls for each case to be analyzed separately, and for the conclusions to be compared with 
other cases. By reviewing cases on a case-by-case basis, clear descriptions emerge as to 
what each particular case may attempt to accomplish within the context of the fact pattern 
presented by the parties. 
 This type of research is clearly qualitative in nature. The present study utilized a 
qualitative framework but with a slightly different focus than most types of legal 
research. The method envisioned has been termed “Evaluation Studies” (Leeuw, 2011).  
Evaluation studies are a type of qualitative study that attempts to take a broader view of 
the cases that have been decided. It attempts to succeed at “applying different theories, 
methodologies, and (research) designs” (Leeuw, 2011). The general goal is to evaluate 
the criteria, rules and factors that played a role in the court decision. Many courts reach 
their decision based upon factors that are clearly identifiable and quite similar to factors 
present in many other cases. Would a broad view of these cases help to shed light on 
general factors that are constant in their effect on the outcome? 
 
3.2 Research Design 
The specific method used in this study was to evaluate the relevant number or 
portion of the Federal cases that cite the “Electronic Communications Privacy Act” 
(ECPA) since the act’s passage in 1986. Although only two of these decisions are United 
States Supreme Court decisions, the remainder are reported by various Courts of Appeals. 
A total of 199 cases have been adjudicated by the fourteen United States Courts of 
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Appeal. Although the focus is on the ECPA and how those decisions that were made 
pursuant to the ECPA affected the outcome of the case, other factors were also explored. 
Additionally, the ideas that digital privacy must always remain limited by the prevailing 
legal theories are challenged. Many other legal theories have been advanced to protect 
privacy rights. Some theories generally allude to intellectual property theories, while 
other theories look at privacy as a “Public Good.” Relevant theories are evaluated and 
analyzed.  
A number of questions can be answered by such a study. To what extent has a 
prevailing legal ideology developed that is largely fact dependent? The study will be a 
cross between a “qualitative analysis,” and a “grounded theory study.” That is to say that 
the study will take a broad perspective of important relevant decisions relating to the 
ECPA and privacy in general and not over-analyze the ruling or conclusion reached by 
the court. This study attempted to answer some broad questions related to the first general 
research question: “Does the United States adequately protect Digital Privacy Rights?” 
The remaining two questions presented are also analyzed. 
 
 
3.3 Process and Procedures 
This study was conducted utilizing relevant cases and statutes. The legal research 
service “Westlaw” (https://www.westlaw.com) was used to find cases that matched the 
subject matter of cases dealing with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). 
Two cases were from the United States Supreme Court. These two cases are dealt with 
separately and not included in Chart 4.1. Cases were limited to the cases at the federal 
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appellate level to assure that these cases were not mere anomalies or “one offs,” but truly 
represented common law precedent in the federal courts with stare decisis impact.  
Westlaw is one of two major commercial legal research platforms in the United States. 
The other legal research source is LexisNexis (https://www.lexisnexis.com). Westlaw 
gives the researcher the assurance that every published case in any court in the United 
States can be searched and found. After a number of efforts to isolate the relevant cases 
for analysis, it was determined that two search terms provided the level of reliability 
needed in identifying the cases.  
The relevant search terms involved finding cases that used the four letter acronym 
“ECPA” as well as expanding that search to cases where the parties and the court never 
used the acronym but always referred to the statute by its formal name of the “Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act.” A Boolian search term was constructed to search the 
entire database of United States Courts of Appeal cases. The Boolian search term that 
worked the best was; electronic /s communication /s privacy /s act. This search term 
identified every case that had those four terms in a single sentence or line. After 
identifying the 199 cases from the various US Courts of Appeal, the cases were studied to 
determine what impact, if any, the case would have on ECPA precedent and digital 
privacy. Three categories were created to compile results into a meaningful and cohesive 
matrix for further analysis. The three categories are:   
     Expands Digital Privacy Rights 
Limits Digital Privacy Rights 




Because the study was focused on whether or not judicial decisions have helped 
to either expand or limit electronic or digital privacy rights, those cases constituted the 
major focus. Cases that were analyzed to have “Expand[ed] Digital Privacy Rights” 
became the cases to evaluate where and how the courts had interpreted the ECPA in a 
manner to further digital privacy rights. The converse is true with cases that limited 
digital privacy rights. In addition to the question regarding the present state of the ECPA, 
this research endeavored to study the history and efficacy of intellectual property rights 
as they may either impact or inform privacy rights. In reviewing the cases and laws, 
majority, concurring and dissenting opinions of the judges were considered. If the cases 
dealt with either the violation of digital privacy rights or intellectual property regarding 
patents and copyrights, they were considered and analyzed.  
The cases were also analyzed that dealt with privacy rights that were protected to 
see if particular rulings involved either violations of privacy rights, or possibly legislation 
to correct or change those privacy rights issues that arose. Since 1986, no comprehensive 
legislation has been adopted to deal with privacy rights in the digital age. The results of 
what was determined from studying the 199 cases follows in a later section. It is fair to 
state now that there is a patchwork quilt of laws that have failed to protect private citizens 






3.4 Summary  
 
This chapter discussed methodology used in this study. This research was 
conducted as a legal inquiry into past and present laws dealing with privacy rights in the 
digital, electronic, and communications arenas. Cases involving violations of privacy 
rights were examined and the efforts were made to identify patterns in the judgments of 
judges as case law around digital privacy rights evolved. 
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4.1 Analysis of Case Law 
The data in this study represented a legal inquiry into legal cases that had a direct 
bearing on the issue of privacy rights, as protected and expanded in the 1986 Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act. Each of the 199 cases were qualitatively evaluated to 
determine what rights were involved and how these rights were affected. In many cases it 
was quite clear that the person or persons asserting privacy rights prevailed. These cases 
were all grouped together in the category of “Expands Digital Privacy Rights.” In other 
cases, the person or persons that asserted privacy rights were defeated or limited in the 
result the court implemented. These cases were all identified with the designator of 
“Limits Digital Privacy Rights.” Some cases involved rulings that ultimately were 
decided on other grounds or were decided in such a way as to not affect any digital 
privacy rights. Although the subject matters were different in the varied cases, they were 
all able to be reduced to one of the three categories above. Because of the qualitative 
nature of this study, no quantitative analyses of the data were indicated. 
Although the study focused on cases citing the ECPA, it is important to note hat 
the earliest instance of where privacy rights were discussed was in 1890 in the Harvard 
Law Review (Harvard Law Review, 4, 5, 1890). Since then, the U.S. courts have 
recognized the right to privacy, in various forms. This study, of course, focuses on digital 
privacy rights and how laws, particularly the ECPA has affected digital privacy rights. 
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4.2 Relevant Legislation 
The advent of the microcomputer and the rapid growth of the internet swamped 
any effort to properly regulate this technology. The failure of Congress and state 
legislatures to properly keep up with this rapid growth resulted in the courts’, by 
necessity, addressing these issues. The courts, restrained by precedent and stare decisis, 
have been unable to keep up with this massive growth in technology, particularly in a 
systematic and comprehensive manner. This has resulted in incongruity, depending on 
which jurisdiction you may reside in, or which federal circuit where you may reside. 
4.3 A Comparison of Relevant Cases 
After evaluating the 199 cases, a chart was developed to easily ascertain the effect 
each case has on digital privacy rights. An examination of the cases revealed 31 of the 
199 demonstrating some expansion of digital privacy rights. 73 cases showed little or no 
impact on digital privacy rights. But the majority of the cases, 95 to be specific, revealed 
limitations and curtailments of digital privacy rights.  The factors that were considered to 
determine whether or not a case was classified as (E) Expansion of Digital Privacy 
Rights, (L) Limitation of Digital Privacy Rights, or (D) Does not impact Digital Privacy 
Rights are as follows: 
a. Did the party that was asserting a digital privacy right prevail in protecting 
that right or was that right not protected? 
37 
 
b. Did the party that was opposed to the asserted digital privacy right 
successfully achieve their goals in contravention of the asserted digital privacy 
right. 
c. Did the court decide the case on grounds that were unrelated to the asserted 
digital privacy right? 
d. Did the case involve factors that did not involve a digital privacy right, but 
was related to some of the criminal provisions of the ECPA, resulting in no 
impact on any ascertainable digital privacy rights? 
e. Does the case represent a situation that general privacy rights are implicated 
and affected, although the impact in the instant case may be tenuous? 
f. Considering all of the factors in a-e above, can it fairly be said that by a 
preponderance of evidence the privacy rights were either expanded, limited, or 
not affected? 
Table 4.3 presents the 199 cases according to whether the judicial decision 
limited, expanded or had no impact on digital privacy rights. The table lists each case, 
identifying the year and the court from which the decision was rendered and the citation 












Case Name Year Citation Appeals 
Court 
Result 
     
In re Nickelodeon 
Consumer Privacy 
Litigation 
2016 ---F.3d---- Third Circuit L 
United States v. Graham 2016 --- F.3d ---- Fourth Circuit L 




Jane Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC 
2016 817 F.3d 12 First Circuit L 
Vista Marketing, LLC v. 
Burkett 
2016 812 F.3d 954 Eleventh 
Circuit 
E 
Jewel v. National Sec. 
Agency 
2015 810 F.3d 622 Ninth Circuit L 
Tech Systems, Inc. v. Pyles 2015 630 Fed.Appx. 
184 
Fourth Circuit E 
In re Google Inc. Cookie 
Placement Consumer 
Privacy Litigation 
2015 806 F.3d 125 Third Circuit L 
Long v. Insight 
Communications of Cent. 
Ohio, LLC. 
2015 804 F.3d 791 Sixth Circuit L 
U.S. v. Daniels 2015 803 F.3d 335 Seventh 
Circuit 
D 
United States v. 
Christensen 
2015 801 F.3d 970 Ninth Circuit D 
U.S. v. Graham 2015 796 F.3d 332 Fourth Circuit L 
Anzaldua v. Northeast 
Ambulance and Fire 
Protection Dist. 
2015 793 F.3d 822 Eighth Circuit D 
American Civil Liberties 
Union v. Clapper 
2015 785 F.3d 787 Second 
Circuit 
E 
U.S. v. Davis 2015 758 F.3d 498 Eleventh 
Circuit 
L 




Table 4.3 Continued 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial ECPA Decisions 
 
Case Name Year Citation Appeals 
Court 
Result 
In re Zynga Privacy 
Litigation 
2014 750 F.3d 1098 Ninth Circuit L 
Telecommunications 
Regulatory Board of 
Puerto Rico v. CTIA-
Wireless Ass’n 
2014 752 F.3d 60 First Circuit E 





Tysman v. Pellicano 2014 555 Fed.Appx. 
677  
Ninth Circuit D 
Electronic Frontier 
Foundation v. U.S. Dept. 
of Justice 




Joffe v. Google, Inc. 2013 746 F.3d 920 Ninth Circuit E 
Joffe v. Google, Inc. 2013 729 F.3d 1262 Ninth Circuit E 
In re U.S. Historical Cell 
Site Data 
2013 724 F.3d 600 Fifth Circuit L 
Mortensen v. Bresnan 
Communications, LLC. 
2013 722 F.3d 1151 Ninth Circuit D 
Seitz v. City of Elgin 2013 719 F.3d 654 Seventh 
Circuit 
L 
Sams v. Yahoo! Inc. 2013 713 F.3d 1175 Ninth Circuit L 
U.S. v. Barajas 2013 710 F.3d 1102 Tenth Circuit L 
Lane v. Facebook, Inc. 2013 709 F.3d 791 Ninth Circuit D 
In re U.S. for an Order 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
Section 2703(D) 
2013 707 F.3d 283 Fourth Circuit L 
Kirch v. Embarq 
Management Co. 
2012 702 F.3d 1245 Tenth Circuit L 
Garcia v. City of Laredo, 
Tex. 
2012 702 F.3d 788 Fifth Circuit L 
Lane v. Facebook, Inc. 2012 696 F.3d 811 Ninth Circuit D 
Schnabel v. Trilegiant 
Corp. 




Information Center v. 
National Sec. Agency 







Table 4.3 Continued 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial ECPA Decisions 
 
Case Name Year Citation Appeals 
Court 
Result 





Jewel v. National Sec. 
Agency 
2011 673 F.3d 902 Ninth Circuit E 
In re National Sec. Agency 
Telecommunications 
Records Litigation 
2011 671 F.3d 881 Ninth Circuit L 
Nachshin v. AOL, LLC 2011 663 F.3d 1034 Ninth Circuit D 
Suzion Energy Ltd. V. 
Microsoft Corp. 
2011 671 F .3d 726 Ninth Circuit E 
American Civil Liberties 
Union v. U.S. Dept. of 
Justice 




Bowden v. Kirkland & 
Ellis LLP 





U.S. v. Clenney 2011 631 F.3d 658 Fourth Circuit L 
U.S. v. Warshak 2010 631 F.3d 266 Sixth Circuit L 
U.S. v. Szymuszkiewicz 2010 622 F.3d 701 Seventh 
Circuit 
E 
Beaven v. U.S. Dept. of 
Justice 
2010 622 F.3d 540 Sixth Circuit E 
In re Application of U.S. 
for an Order Directing a 
Provider of Electronic 
Communication Service to 
Disclose Records to 
Government 
2010 620 F.3d 304 Third Circuit L 
Bott v. Vistaprint USA Inc. 2010 392 Fed.Appx. 
327 
Fifth Circuit D 
Shlahtichman v. 1-800 
Contacts, Inc. 
2010 615 F.3d 794 Seventh 
Circuit 
L 
U.S. v. Amanuel 2010 615 F.3d 117 Second 
Circuit 
L 
Mink v. Knox 2010 613 F.3d 995 Tenth Circuit E 





U.S. v. Trout 2010 369 Fed.Appx. 
493 




Table 4.3 Continued 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial ECPA Decisions 
 
Case Name Year Citation Appeals 
Court 
Result 
U.S. v. Navas 2010 597 F.3d 492 Second 
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E = Expands Digital Privacy Rights 
L = Limits Digital Privacy Rights 
D = Does Not Impact Digital Privacy Rights. 
 
N = 199 
  
In Figure 4.1, the cases are presented graphically according to the level of impact. 
As the figure illustrates, nearly 48% of judicial decisions in the United States Courts of 
Appeal resulted in a limitation of digital privacy rights. Approximately 16% of cases 
actually led to an expansion of digital privacy rights. And finally, about 37% of cases had 
little or no impact on individual digital privacy rights. 
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Figure 4.1 Distribution of ECPA Cases by Level of Impact 
 Judicial decisions within the U.S. Courts of Appeal can vary widely. As Figure 42 
illustrates, the twelve Circuit Courts of Appeal arrive at decisions independently. The 
graph demonstrates the extent to which each Circuit Court decided to expand or limit 
digital privacy rights.  
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ECPA Cases by Federal Circuit
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When examining judicial cases before the Circuit Courts of Appeal, it became clear that 
although a case involved the ECPA, the judicial decisions were often made on other legal 
grounds that resulted in no impact on digital privacy rights. In the next few figures those 
(no impact) cases were ignored.  For those cases that did have an impact, Figure 4.3 
shows the comparison between cases that limited digital privacy rights versus cases that 
expanded such rights.  
 
Figure 4.3 ECPA Cases by Circuit Court that Expand or Limit Digital Privacy Rights 
 Considering the cases that had an impact, 63% or 126 of the original 199 relevant 
cases showed positive or negative impact. As the pie chart in Figure 4.4 shows, only 
24.6% of cases expanded digital privacy rights while 75.4% limited digital privacy rights. 
Although we can see some differences, the overall result of limiting privacy rights was 
















                     
Figure 4.4 The Proportion of Cases that Expand or Limit Digital Privacy Rights 
 There are twelve United States Courts of Appeal. In some cases, these Circuits do 
not follow exact parameters for regions of the country. In grouping them by region and 
level of impact, a picture can be drawn that helps us to visualize the differences in how 
the courts are deciding digital privacy cases. Figure 4.5 depicts cases that expanded or 
limited digital privacy rights by region. As the figure shows, 85% of these cases in the 
Southern region limited digital privacy rights, while only 15% expanded rights. For 
Midwestern Courts of Appeal, 78% of cases limited digital privacy rights while 22% 
expanded such rights. Approximately 75% of Eastern Courts of Appeal limited digital 
privacy rights while 25% expanded these rights. And for those Courts of Appeal 
identified as lying in the Western region, about 70% of cases resulted in limiting digital 
privacy rights while 30% expanded such rights. 
Comparison between Federal ECPA cases from Appellate 





Figure 4.5 ECPA Cases by Approximate Region and Percentage of Impact 
For purposes of designation into approximate region, the courts were devided in the 
following manner; 
South = Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. 
Midwest = Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. 
West = Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 
East = First, Second, Third, Fourth, and DC Circuits. 
 
4.4 In the Matter of Probable Cause and the Right to Privacy 
The history of privacy rights in America are inextricably tied to the history of 
fourth amendment probable cause law. Because privacy is a judicially made philosophy, 
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has been tied to the history and development of constitutional law as it relates to the 
various amendments. The fourth amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and 
seizures has been the primary vehicle to test and ascertain the boundaries of how privacy 
laws is enforced. 
Probable cause has a troubled history. As early as 1949, the Supreme Court of the 
United States was grappling with the idea of what it means for probable cause to be 
necessary for warrants to issue. Of historical importance, is the idea that probable cause is 
considered by the court to be the relevant standard for both parts of the fourth 
amendment. The fourth amendment states in the first part that “the right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated…” (Retrieved from 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment).  
This right to be secure in our persons, houses, papers and effects is a right that 
protects against intrusions by government officials into our private lives without some 
sort of reasonableness. The court  has usee the idea of probable cause to supply that 
reasonableness.  
The same probable cause and reasonableness is pulled from the second half of the 
amendment. The amendment goes on to state that “... And no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (Retrieved from  
http://constitution.findlaw.com/amendment4.html).  
The court has consistently ruled that probable cause is a standard for the entire 
amendment and that the security referenced in the first part of the amendment is protected 
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by the same probable cause that exists in the second part of the amendment. There are 
numerous Law Review articles and legal scholars that have taken exception with that 
approach. For purposes of this study, we do not need to analyze those theories.  It is 
sufficient to understand that although there are criticisms of the instability of probable 
cause doctrine, that instability is based upon what the court should have actually ruled, 
and the limitations they have imposed. 
The real crux of the issue as it relates to privacy rights, is that the fourth 
amendment was never when adopted contemplated to address electronic and digital 
information, and the Fourth Amendment could not have possibly been drafted in a 
manner to protect those important rights. Nevertheless, and amazingly, the concept and 
doctrine of probable cause has been consistently unstable over the years. The instability 
in Fourth Amendment rulings have resulted in instability in the concept of privacy. 
In early Supreme Court cases like the Brennegan case in 1949, the United States 
Supreme Court saw the need to make sure that probable cause was a serious standard that 
protected citizens from not only unlawful arrests but also from unreasonable seizures. 
Two cases in the 1960s solidified that approach. The first case was Aguilar v Texas 
decided in 1964 (Aguilar v. Tex., 378 U.S. 108 U.S., 1964). This case implemented what 
became known as the two-pronged test. The second case was known as Spinelli v United 
States (393 U.S. 410, 89 S. CT. 584, 21 L. ED. 2D 637 (1969), this case solidified and 
upheld the idea of a two-pronged test. The two-pronged test is described as follows: 
(11) the affidavit for search warrant must set forth underlying circumstances 
necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge validity of informants 
conclusion and (2) affiant- officers must support their claim that their informant was 
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credible or his information reliable.” (Retrieved from 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/aguilar-spinelli-test/).  
This two-pronged test was an important part of American jurisprudence for nearly 
20 years. It was a clear and rigid test that assured that false information was not used to 
obtain warrants. It also assured that magistrates and judges were conscientious in 
ascertaining the veracity of the information that was presented to them to support 
affidavits for warrants. 
By 1983, the U. S. Supreme Court had become far more conservative, under the 
leadership of Justice William Rehnquist. Fourth amendment probable cause was 
redefined to limit a person’s expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment 
(Tomkovicv, 2013). A series of cases severely limited the ability of citizens to prevent 
warrantless searches. This new definition also changed what it meant to have probable 
cause, and what was necessary to obtain a probable cause warrant from a magistrate or 
judge. This is not the first sea-change in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence relative to 
fourth amendment law. But this particular change has an interesting effect on privacy 
rights. In the case of Illinois v Gates (462 U.S. 213, 1983), the United States Supreme 
Court implemented a new test. They abandoned the two-pronged test under Aguilar and 
Spinelli, and implemented a quote “totality of the circumstances” test that did not have 
multiple parts. This new test also implemented two other doctrines that severely limited 
the protection of probable cause. One doctrine was the idea of the “four corners doctrine” 
(Pendergast, 1993) 
This doctrine postulates that magistrates and judges that are hearing testimony in 
support of issuance of a warrant, only need to look within the four corners of the affidavit 
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to determine whether or not probable cause exists. This essentially meant that inquiries as 
to the veracity of the person submitting the affidavit no longer played a role in 
determining whether or not probable cause truly existed. In only looking within the four 
corners of the document a judge or magistrate may conclude that sufficient information 
has been provided for probable cause to exists, and a warrant should issue. Amazingly, 
the idea of the totality of circumstances is in many ways oxymoronic. What the court 
phrased as a “totality of circumstances” in reality was a severe limit on inquiry about 
circumstances. Magistrates and judges were no longer required to independently verify or 
inquire about the veracity of the officer presenting the affidavit, and the underlying 
veracity of the affiants themselves. It simply was enough that when they looked at the 
four corners of the document and read what was presented to them in the affidavit, that if 
they could conclude that under the “totality of the circumstances” the court could 
conclude that probable cause existed, then a warrant should issue. 
This notion of probable cause became embedded in the court’s cases from that 
point forward. So much so that it is now considered precedential, and even the purported 
liberal wing of the court no longer vigorously attacks this idea. At the time it was 
decided, in a 5 to 4 decision, the four more liberal justices of the Supreme Court 
strenuously and vigorously objected to this reinterpretation of probable cause law. They 
believed that this new test, or lack of a test, would ultimately lead to the breakdown of 
Fourth Amendment protections that the Constitution was trying to support for American 
citizens. By the year 2013, the idea that probable cause no longer had a two-pronged test, 
but was simply a totality of the circumstances test, was well-established jurisprudence. In 
that year in Florida v. Harris, a decidedly liberal judge, Justice Elena Kagan wrote a 
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unanimous decision that upheld the idea that the totality of the circumstances test was a 
common sense standard of probable cause. One only needs to look back at the dissenting 
opinions that were filed in the US v Gates case to realize that probable cause had been 
irrevocably and demonstrably weakened. 
More importantly to this discussion, is the general idea that electronic and digital 
privacy rights are not the same as fourth amendment rights protecting physical space. 
Electronic and digital privacy rights encompass part and parcel of an enhanced idea of 
privacy as it relates to Americans today. Privacy, or the right to be left alone, is one of the 
most important rights that allows individuals to function in a modern-day society. 
Whether with computers; within our personal space; with tablets and cell phones; or on 
social media with the requisite relationships and connections, our privacy rights should 
protect almost all of our daily activities. Incursions by police into physical space as 
contemplated by the fourth amendment are by necessity limited in scope. Even in high 
police presence areas, the vast majority of citizens do not come in contact with the police 
or other government actors attempting to invade their space. When you look at the 
probable cause laws that developed around automobiles, houses, and other personal 
effects, you have to realize immediately that there aren’t enough police, investigators, 
and other government officials to compromise everyone’s fourth amendment rights. 
On the other hand, if we start looking at electronic and digital rights, the 
technology exists presently to wreck-havoc on a persons’ life by violating their privacy. 
We now know that as shown by NSA surveillance, and private company security 
breaches, that everyday citizens’ rights could all be affected in a major, extensive and 
pervasive manner, without the need for the physical presence of police, other government 
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actors and/or private sector entities. Just the pure scope of the capability of government 
entities, and corporate entities, to infiltrate, compromise, and utilize personal information 
is astounding and mind-boggling. 
This dissertation makes the case that probable cause has not been, nor ever will 
provide sufficient protection to protect Americans rights to digital privacy from 
incursions by government. Digital privacy incursions by other entities; including 
corporations and individuals, are likewise not protected by existing jurisprudential norms. 
Digital privacy deserves a much higher standard of care then ordinary privacy! The 
higher standard of Clear and Convincing Evidence, as discussed in the next chapter, will 
allow for the adequate protection of these important digital privacy rights. 
 
4.5 The Doctrine of Clear and Convincing 
Before clearly articulating the history of the law behind “clear and convincing 
evidence,” it is important to briefly look at a partial spectrum of levels of proof 
recognized in the American judicial system. While this is not a comprehensive review, it 
does take a look at the four most prevalent standards. There are other standards such as 
articulable suspicion, or rational basis test, to name a few, that are present in American 
jurisprudence. While acknowledging that these other standards exist, we focus on the four 
discussed here because they are necessary to understand where in the spectrum of legal 




We have already mentioned probable cause. Of the four standards that we are 
briefly reviewing, “probable cause” is the most lenient, weakest, standard available. It 
simply means, in laymen’s terms that something is more likely than not likely. Another 
standard that is tougher, and the standard in use to determine whether or not a plaintiff 
wins in a civil case, is the standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance 
of the evidence is simply the idea that when all of the evidence is weighted, one side has 
shown that the evidence is stronger on their side versus on the other side. Many people 
visualize this test as the test most analogous to the scales of justice. Using the scales of 
justice analogy, if the evidence on one side outweighs the evidence on the other side, by 
ever so slight a margin, then the weightier side wins. 
The toughest test that we have, of the four that we are looking at, and actually one 
of the toughest tests of all, is the standard used in criminal cases. It is the well-known 
standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  The standard articulated in a test called “clear 
and convincing” falls between a “preponderance of the evidence” and beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It is certainly a higher standard than “probable cause” by a long shot. 
The history of the “clear and convincing” standard is not nearly as muddled and troubled 
as the probable cause standard. This “clear and convincing” standard is used in many 
areas of the law, most notably for our purposes in patent invalidity cases and patent 
conflicts (Microsoft v Limited partnership, 2011). 
This case was decided by a unanimous Supreme Court and thereby leaves no 
doubt as to the parameters and meaning of the ruling. “Clear and convincing” is also 
described by the court as “clear and cogent.” The court indicated that there was a 
presumption of validity to a patent that has already been issued by the Copyright and 
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Patent Office, and that this presumption can only be rebutted with the “clear and 
convincing” evidence standard, (Microsoft v Limited partnership, 2011). Other cases also 








The idea of privacy as a type of intellectual property is a novel concept at the 
intersection of two disciplines. This dissertation submitted to Purdue University 
Polytechnic Institute is part of the PhD in Technology program and the Technology 
Leadership and Innovation Department. As part of that degree process, the College of 
Technology (now Polytechnic Institute) in conjunction with the Graduate School, granted 
the author permission to complete one of his cognates necessary for his degree, in 
Intellectual Property at the McKinney School of Law of Indiana University at IUPUI. All 
of the information concerning Intellectual Property was a part of that effort where the 
author received an LL.M. degree in Intellectual Property Law.  
Because this entire section that discusses intellectual property law is contained within that 
thesis, multiple citations are eliminated. Excerpts from the unpublished thesis 
“Ascertaining a Coherent Theory for Differences in Criminal versus non-Criminal 
Treatment of Copyright Infringers versus Patent Law Infringers” are reproduced here in 
Chapter Five, and in other sections of this document, to complete the effort to merge the 
two disciplines into one cohesive whole, effectuating the dual nature of one of the 
cognates, intellectual property law, synergistically interacting with the subject of 





5.1 Findings  
It is important to go back and look at the research questions that were asked and 
to look to the research to answer those questions.  
 
1.      What is the current status of digital privacy laws in the United States? 
 
This question is best answered by demonstrating the stagnant nature of digital privacy 
laws. Because Congress has failed to enact any comprehensive updates of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, the courts have had to deal with many cases of first 
impression without any statutory guidance. With twelve federal circuits and most cases 
being heard by three judge panels, a lot of variation in results occurs. Depending on 
which circuit you live in, your chances may differ as to which result or outcome you may 
receive. The lack of guidance at the United States Courts of Appeal level also manifests 
itself in the hundreds of decisions rendered by both the federal lower courts, as well as 
state courts in all fifty states. Digital privacy rights, like liberty, should not depend on 
what state you live in or by the luck of which judge you may have had assigned to your 
case. 
 
2. How have judicial decisions affected the digital privacy rights of citizens 
Since 1986? 
 There is no question that the ECPA in 1986 was a forward-looking act. The problem 
Congress faced in 1986 was that they did not have “tea leaves” or a crystal ball that they 
could use to foresee the future. They could not possibly have anticipated the explosion of 
62 
 
technological growth over the past 30 years. Because Congress has not acted in a 
comprehensive fashion since the ECPA, courts were left to “pick up the slack.” With 
numerous court decisions coming from the state and federal level, the anomalies are 
readily apparent. Some courts have routinely found in favor of the person attempting to 
assert their digital privacy rights. Other courts have routinely found a way to limit digital 
privacy rights. As the availability and presence of electronic devices have continued to 
grow exponentially, areas of the law that were not designed to address the complexities 
of a modern digital economy have had to be improvised. This improvisation has resulted 
in vastly different results. 
 
3. Do current laws adequately protect the digital and electronic privacy rights 
of citizens?  
No. Digital privacy rights are not well protected. This dissertation presents two 
paradigm shifts that would forever change the parameters of digital privacy protection. 
These new paradigms are: 
a. Clear and convincing as the standard needed to justify an incursion or 
violation of a person’s digital privacy rights. 
b. Digital privacy as intellectual property. 
The idea that we have an entire body of law that exists to protect IP rights and even 
allows for criminal sanctions in the case of Copyright violations, is quite instructive as to 
the premium society places on protecting intangible property rights. 
Digital privacy is a type of Intellectual Property(IP) that needs protection to the 
same extent as copyrights and patents. Our failure to recognize that digital privacy 
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deserves the same level of protection as historically recognized types of intellectual 
property shortchanges the importance of digital privacy rights. 
This chapter focuses on five related concepts that play a role in how digital 
privacy rights are interrelated to intellectual property rights. The basic idea that the 
United States of America would protect intellectual property was an idea that originated 
in the first constitutional document. This chapter will accomplish a number of things: 
One, we will look at the historical basis as found in the Constitution for the protection of 
intellectual property; Two, we will look at the historical basis for the protection of 
intellectual property prior to the adoption of the Constitution as adopted by other 
societies prior to the founding of the United States; Three, we will look at an extremely 
early biblical example of what could be described as copyright and by extension privacy 
protection. The biblical example is certainly on the creative side. But it does suggest that 
the idea protecting images dates way before the historical analysis given by most 
scholars; Four, this analysis will trace the historical divide between copyright law and 
patent law; Five, a case will be made that digital privacy should be recognized as an 
intellectual property right. Recognizing digital privacy as an intellectual property right 
would enhance the legal protections and enhance the ability to collect damages for 
breaches. This chapter will look extensively at how the differences between Copyright 
law and Patent law came about. This analysis is important to the final argument, made 
extensively later, that no real difference should exist in how we as a society protect patent 
rights, copyright interests, and digital privacy rights. First, we look at the differences 
between Copyright and Patent laws. Both of these types of intellectual property, patent 
and copyright, emanate from within the exact same clause in the Constitution. At some 
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point we will see that they detoured on completely separate paths. The one path we will 
call the copyright path. This particular path ended up with dual enforcement mechanisms 
for copyright infringers. One method is civil enforcement of copyright violations. The 
other method is criminal enforcement of copyright violations. Obviously, when you are 
able to harness the power of the state (criminal enforcement) to protect individual 
property rights you have accomplished something worth noting. The other path we will 
call the patent path. The patent path does not generally have two types of enforcement. 
The patent path consists only of private or civil enforcement. After reviewing these 
anomalies, the subject of how these concepts may protect or enhance digital privacy 
rights will be explored. This subject area has been explored, to some extent, in two cases 
without particular success.  
This analysis is extremely important to the discussion of privacy rights because 
privacy rights are impacted by multiple actors. On the one hand, you have government 
intrusion on individual and corporate digital privacy rights. On another hand, you have 
corporate and individual intrusions on digital privacy rights. Business speaks the 
language of money. Governments speak the language of power. Individuals speak the 
language of liberty. That is to say, that if you want to have an impact on a business or 
corporation, simply affect their bottom line in such a manner as to cause pain to the 
investors. Fines, judgments, and any other type of financial penalty ultimately will 
convince businesses to change their ways, or to abandon certain behaviors. This is clearly 
the idea behind punitive damages. It sends a signal to the tortfeasor as well as other 




The same does not apply for government, particularly the federal government. 
Governments by their nature have almost unlimited resources. Whatever resources they 
don’t have, they generally can raise by either increasing taxes, or local governments can 
raise money by floating bonds. Financial incentives have some impact, but not to the 
same extent that they impact businesses. Power is the language of government. Limited 
capability to do certain things, and you can expect to see certain results that are reflective 
of preventing the limitations. Governments want to go about doing what they want to do 
unencumbered. The last major player in effecting privacy rights are individuals. 
Individuals deal in the currency of liberty, and money. But to someone who does not 
have significant sums of money, no financial disincentive exists to prevent certain types 
of behavior. Criminal penalties on the other hand would be very effective. Relative 
recently, Congress implemented bills like Dodd-Frank that provides criminal penalties 
for corporate directors and officers. The same deterrent effect could impact corporations 
and other legal entities by impacting the officers and directors. The discussion regarding 
differences in how patent offenders and copyright offenders are treated relative to 
criminal and civil penalties is quite informative to the general need to enforce digital 
privacy rights with both civil and criminal options. 
The question this research poses is simple but important. Why have we not as a 
society started to think of digital privacy rights as a type of intellectual property? The 
similarities are great. For example, trade secrets are for the exclusive purpose of 




The two cases where privacy has been asserted as intellectual property reach some 
rather bizarre results, clearly demonstrating the need for Congress and society to rethink 
the relationship between intellectual property and digital privacy.  
In Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC., The plaintiff, Bollea, attempted to use 
copyright laws to protect his privacy in a video of him having sex with a woman that was 
not his wife. The court refused to allow Mr. Bollea to use what the court described as an 
invalid Copyright claim to prevent the distribution of this video.  This raises question of 
how a valid copyright claim may be able to be used to protect digital privacy claims. The 
Bollea case also raises questions concerning the relatively new field related to the “Right 
of Publicity.” The right of publicity is another concept worth exploring as it relates to 
intellectual property and digital privacy rights, but that discussion is beyond the purview 
of this study and may be a ripe area for further study. A second case in the United States 
Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit reached a similar result. In the case of Garcia v 
Google, the Plaintiff, Ms. Garcia attempted to block the distribution of an inflammatory 
anti-Islamic video that included footage of her that was shot for what she was told was a 
different video. She had no intention of appearing in an anti-Islamic video, and was 
misled to believe that the video she agreed to appear in would not be anti-Islamic. The 
court concluded that as a non-owner of the video, she had no proprietary recognizable 
interest in the video footage that would allow her to prevent its dissemination.  
Once again though, the question remains open as to how an individual or 
individuals that actually have a valid digital privacy interest that could either be 
characterized similarly as a copyright or patent claim; a trade secret claim or any other 
recognized intellectual property right. The core argument of this chapter embodies the 
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idea that the same mechanisms used to protect IP rights, could also be used to protect 
digital privacy rights invasions. In analyzing the impact that intellectual property has on 
privacy rights, it is important to first look at the historical differences between how 
copyright and patent violations have been treated differently under American 
Jurisprudence. There've been a number of authors over the years who have looked at this 
anomaly.  
This legal inquiry takes a completely different path. This study does address many 
of the historical arguments as to why this distinction between patent law and copyright 
law came into existence. Although, in exploring the various areas and theories that have 
been promulgated, this paper will conclude that none of the rationales that have been 
postulated so far fully explains the different treatment between the two intellectual 
property areas. Ultimately, the paper will apply theoretical paradigms not heretofore 
applied to the area of intellectual property law. These theories are well known and well 
respected theories in the area of criminology and criminal justice. There are also theories 
that sociologists have long recognized as playing a major part in the development of 
laws, policies, and the rules and regulations that govern our society. In short, one theory 
is called by many “conflict theory.” Although there are other names for the theory, it is 
generally recognized as “conflict theory” with variations, depending on the scholar and 
scope.  Conflict theory postulates that laws, rules and regulations reflect the disparate 
power relationship between the “haves and the have-nots.” Those in society who actually 
have money, influence, and power, make the rules. A colloquial way of saying this is that 
“he who has the gold makes the rules.” (Author unknown, citations omitted. Some have 
argued that a comic strip in 1964 first used the expression, but that history is contradicted 
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by other scholars). We will see there's a lot of truth to this statement. I will argue in this 
presentation that conflict theory accounts for more of the practical difference in how 
copyrights are handled versus how patents are handled. It would be disingenuous for me 
to suggest that this theory is the only theory that accounts for the variation. I do not make 
that claim. We live in a society that is complex and complicated.  
A well-known adage in the area of criminology is that you cannot account for all 
crime with one theory. You can only account for a portion of crime with various theories. 
Criminal behavior is so complex that you need a multitude of theories to be able to even 
remotely account for criminal behavior. Intellectual property law is no less complicated. 
Numerous motives, theories, and rationales account for various types of behavior. If 
anyone suggests that they have the magic answer as to why things are the way they are, 
they are not being intellectually honest. I do not make that claim either. What I do claim, 
is that one of the theories underlying the anomalous and unique difference between 
patents and copyrights can be traced to behavior that comports with the theoretical 
underpinnings of conflict theory. To the extent that no one has, to my knowledge, and as 
far as my research indicates, tied intellectual property law to the theoretical paradigm of 
conflict theory, this study breaks new ground.  
Additionally, to the extent that theories regarding the power elite are tied to 
theories related to intellectual property law, they are unique and groundbreaking. 
Notwithstanding this new understanding and theory, I reiterate that you cannot account 
for all behavior by the courts, federal legislature, federal executive branch, and all the 
parties involved in promulgating intellectual property rules and regulations with one 
theory. I do propose though, that without these theories, i.e. conflict theory, and the 
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power elite theories, a true understanding of the reasons why there are anomalous 
differences between patent law and copyright law, our understanding is incomplete. 
These theories help to demonstrate that class conflict differences, money, power, and 
political connectedness play a major role in how laws, rules and regulations are adopted 
and applied. 
5.2 Discussion  
5.2.1 Origins of American Intellectual Property Law 
The United States Constitution, article 1, section 8 indicates that “the Congress 
shall have power to… Promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.” (U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 6.) These 26 words constitute the entire 
constitutional foundation for American intellectual property Law. Our founding fathers 
clearly intended to protect intellectual property and to provide a mechanism for Congress 
to regulate in this area of law. Congress wasted no time in passing legislation and the first 
Intellectual Property law was passed on May 31, 1790. (1790 Copyright Act) The act was 
a copyright act that dealt with “maps, charts, and books not exceeding one year.” Some of 
the relevant portions of the May 1790 Act indicate: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, that from and after the passing of this act, the 
author and authors of any map, chart, book or books already printed within these 
United States, being a citizen or citizens thereof, a resident within the same, his or 
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their executors, administrators or assigns, who hath or have purchased were 
legally acquired the copyright of any such map, chart, book or books in order to 
print, reprinted, published work in the same, shall have the sole right and liberty 
of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending such map, chart, book or books, 
for the term of fourteen years from the recording entitled thereof in the clerk's 
office, as is herein after directed. (1970 Act) 
For the next 100 years, copyright enforcement was a civil matter. Not until 
Congress passed a new Copyright Act in 1897 did criminal penalties become a part of 
copyright law (1897 Copyright Act). That act stated that; 
any person publicly performing or representing any dramatic or musical 
composition for which copyright has been obtained, without the consent of the 
proprietor said dramatic or musical composition, or his heirs or assigns, shall be 
liable for damages therefore, such damages in all cases to be assessed at such 
sum, not less than one hundred dollars for the first and fifty dollars for every 
subsequent performance, as to the court shall appear to be just. If the unlawful 
performance and representation be willful and for profit, such person or persons 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction be imprisoned for a period 
not exceeding one year (1897 Act). 
 
It is quite interesting to note that the criminalization involved public performances 
of copyrighted works. It is also important to note that this law differentiates between 
“willful and for profit” conduct and other conduct presumably either not willful and/or 
not for a profit. (1897 Act) The point of who was covered by this first act that 
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criminalized copyright violations, is an important point. Performers were the primary 
target. Later on, in 1909 Congress amended the copyright act to include “aiding and 
abetting willful and for-profit infringement” (1909 Act.). Many scholars have suggested 
that the reason the act was expanded in 1909 was because the performers that were 
covered by the 1897 act, were primarily transient performers who move from town to 
town. It was next to impossible to sue them because to try to find their permanent home 
address, for service of process, was quite difficult. The 1909 act was passed to allow 
those who believed their copyrighted music and material was violated, could go after bar 
owners, theater managers, and others who were not quite as transient as the performers 
themselves (Copyright Act of 1909). The 1909 Act was far more comprehensive than the 
1897 act and included coverage for the following: 
Section 4. That the works for which copyright may be secured under this act shall 
include all the writings of an author. 
Section 5.  That the application for registration shall specify to which of the 
following classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs: 
(a) Books, including composite an cyclopedic works, directories, gazetteers and other 
compilations;  
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers; 
(c) Lecturers, sermons, addresses, prepared for oral delivery; 
(d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; 
(e) Musical compositions; 
(f) Maps; 
(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art; 
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(h) Reproductions of a work of art; 
(i) Photographs;  
(j) Prints and pictorial illustrations: (Copyright Act of 1909) 
The 1909 Act provided that the above subsections were not intended to limit the 
applicability of copyright law only to categorize the areas. It extended coverage to 
foreigners that were domiciled in the United States at the time first publication of their 
work. That 1909 act spelled out copyright registration requirements, and generally 
provided for 28 years of protection for the copyrighted work, with the possibility of a 28 
year renewal. For purposes of this discussion, the most important provisions of the 1909 
act included: 
Section 25 (e) which provided: 
Whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used or permitted the use of the 
copyrighted work upon the parts of musical instruments serving to reproduce 
mechanically the musical work, then in case of infringement of such copyright by 
the unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale of interchangeable parts, such as disks, 
rolls, bands or cylinders for use in mechanical music-producing machines adapted 
to reproduce the copyrighted music, no criminal action shall be brought, but in a 
civil action an injunction may be granted upon such terms as the court may 
impose, and the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover in lieu of profits and damages 
a royalty as provided in section one subsection (e) of this act. Provided also, that 
whenever any person, in the absence of a license agreement, intends to use a 
copyrighted musical composition upon the parts of instruments serving to 
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reproduce mechanically the musical work, relying upon the compulsory license 
provision of this act, he shall serve notice of such intention by registered mail, 
upon the copyright proprietor at his last address disclosed by the records of the 
copyright office, sending to the copyright office a duplicate of such notice; and in 
case of his failure to do so, the court may, in its discretion, in addition to sums 
hereinabove mentioned, award the complainant further sums, not to exceed three 
times the amount provided by section one, subsection (e), by way of damages and 
not as a penalty, and also a temporary injunction until the full award is paid. 
Section 28. That any person who willfully and for-profit shall infringe any 
copyright secured by this act, or who shall knowingly and willfully aid or abet 
such infringement, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction 
thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not exceeding one year or by a fine 
of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or both, 
in the discretion of the court; (1909 Copyright Act). 
These provisions are quite important to review because the beginnings of a 
division in applicability of the act becomes apparent. Once again performers themselves 
are subject to criminal penalties. Others who willfully and knowingly aid or abet 
performers violating these provisions are also subject to criminal penalties. Excluded 
from criminal penalties are individuals who violate someone's copyright by mechanical 
method. This is an ironic distinction. In 1909 the cost of reproduction equipment was 
quite expensive. The phonograph was invented in 1977 by Thomas Edison and 
mechanical reproduction of music had started. 
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Common ordinary performers and common ordinary citizens would not have 
access to reproduction equipment. The act essentially allows for violation of someone's 
copyright by mechanical means provided that royalties are paid as provided for in the act. 
The gist of this provision is to allow smalltime performers and artists to be charged 
criminally for violating the copyright act, but allowing large corporations, businesses and 
wealthy individuals that have mechanical recording devices to avoid criminal liability 
provided they pay royalties. It is important to note that even if the violation by 
mechanical means is willful and knowing, it is specifically precluded from criminal 
liability. Thus begins the very first clear demarcation between social economic classes in 
copyright law. The same differentiation between social economic classes and how they're 
treated weaves its way throughout intellectual property law for the next generations. 
Fast forward almost another 100 years to see other major changes affecting the 
criminal nature of copyright violations. Acts in 1971, 1974, and 1976 all expanded the 
criminal penalties for copyright violations beyond the 1909 act (1909 Act). These acts 
continued to raise the penalties for copyright violations and the 1971 act finally included 
sound recordings, specifically. First offenses have penalties as much as $10,000 and 
second and repeat offenses have penalties as high as $25,000 (1976 Act). 
The 1971 Act also recognized that willful infringement for-profit of mechanically 
reproduced recording parts should also be subject to criminal liability (1971 Act). The 
1971 act provided a number of provisions including the requirement that copyrighted 
music and/or publications should indicate they are copyrighted on the first page. The act 
further gives a better definition of what it means to be a sound recording (1971 Act). 
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Nevertheless, sound recordings that are mechanically produced did not have full 
copyright protection. The 1971 Act spells out the purpose of the act as; 
“Existing federal copyright law title 17, United States Code, protects the owners 
of copyright in musical works from an authorized and uncompensated duplication 
but there is no federal protection of sound recordings as such. As a result, so-
called “record pirates” if they satisfy the claim of the owner of the musical 
copyright can and do engage in widespread unauthorized reproduction of 
phonograph records and tapes without violating federal copyright law. It is also 
true under existing law that the protection given to owners of copyright in musical 
works with respect to recordings of their works is special and limited. The 
purpose of section 646 as amended is twofold. First, section one of the bill creates 
a limited copyright in sound recordings, as such making unlawful the 
unauthorized reproduction and sell of copyrighted sound recordings. (1971 Act). 
5.2.2 Applicability of the Legislation  
The 1971 Act is quite extensive in the changes that it makes to the law. This was 
in large part to the voluminous findings as indicated in the act. The act goes on to 
indicate: 
The attention of the Committee has been directed to the widespread unauthorized 
reproduction of phonograph records and tapes. While it is difficult to establish the 
exact volume or dollar value of current piracy activity, it is estimated by reliable 
trade sources that the annual volume of such piracy is now in excess of $100 
million. It has been estimated that legitimate prerecorded tape sales have an 
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annual value of approximately $400 million. The pirating of records and tapes is 
not only depriving legitimate manufacturers of substantial income, but of equal 
importance is denying performing artists and musicians of royalties and 
contributions to pension and welfare funds and Federal and State governments are 
losing tax revenues. 
If the unauthorized producers pay the statutory mechanical royalty required by the 
Copyright Act for the use of copyrighted music there is no federal remedy 
currently available to combat the unauthorized reproduction of the recording. 
Eight States have enacted statutes intended to suppress record piracy, but in other 
jurisdictions the only remedy available to the legitimate producers is to seek relief 
in state courts on the theory of unfair competition. A number of suits have been 
filed in various states but even when a case is brought to a successful conclusion 
the remedies available are limited. In addition, the jurisdiction of States to adopt 
legislation specifically aimed at the elimination of record and tape piracy has been 
challenged on the theory that the copyright clause of the Federal Constitution has 
preempted the field even if Congress has not granted any copyright protection to 
sound recordings. While the committee expresses no opinion concerning this legal 
question, it is clear that the extension of copyright protection to sound recordings 
would resolve many of the problems which have arisen in connection with the 
efforts to combat piracy in state courts. (1971 Act) 
It is quite clear from the passage above, that Congress recognized a serious 
problem with the failure to protect sound recordings. The automatic royalty provisions of 
the 1909 act allowed unscrupulous businessmen to sell some recordings by musicians 
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even though these musicians were not under contract to them for their particular 
recordings. The remedy of only being able to collect the actual royalty fees put the 
recording industry and artists at a serious disadvantage. Congress saw this problem and 
corrected it. While this correction may have had a benefit to artists, it was primarily 
passed at the behest of recording studios. After signing artists and producing records they 
had no way to protect themselves from third-party manufacturers that reproduced the 
sound recordings paid the royalty fee, which allow them to sell these records to the 
public. Powerful recording industry tycoons and executives lobbied Congress for these 
changes. 
Both the 1974 act and the 1976 act cleared up other issues and the 1976 act raised 
fines to $25, 000 for a first offense and up to $50, 000 for repeat offenders (1976 Act).  
In 1982 Congress passed the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act  
of 1982. This act was intended to stem a growing amount of piracy for songs and 
 software. This act in relevant part states as follows: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That this Act // 18 USC 2311 // may be cited as 
the “Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982. (1982 Act) 
The 1982 Act implements even greater changes to the law by expanding the 






Section 2 indicates: 
Sec. 2. Section 2318 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as 
follows: Section 2318. Trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords, and 
copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual works; 
(a) Whoever, in any of the circumstances described in subsection (c) of this 
section, knowingly traffics in a counterfeit label affixed or designed to be affixed 
to a phonorecord, or a copy of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, shall 
be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or 
both… 
(e) Except to the extent they are inconsistent with the provisions of this title, all 
provisions of section 509, title 17, United States Code, are applicable to violations 
of subsection (a). 
Sec. 3. Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2318 
the following new section:   
Section. 2319. // 18 USC 2319. // Criminal infringement of a copyright 
(a) Whoever violates section 506(a) (relating to criminal offenses) of title 17 shall 
be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section and such penalties shall 
be in addition to any other provisions of title 17 or any other law. 
(b) Any person who commits an offense under subsection (a) of this section—, 
(1) shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than five 
years, or both, if the offense—, 
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(A) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one–hundred–and–
eighty–day period, of at least one thousand phonorecords or copies infringing the 
copyright in one or more sound recordings (1982 Act). 
This act once again raised the possible fines for violation to up to $250.000.00. 
The 1982 Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments act of 1982 was by far the most 
aggressive and repressive copyright act passed by Congress, it goes on to indicate: 
(B) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one–hundred–and–
eighty–day period, of at least sixty—, five copies infringing the copyright in one 
or more motion pictures or other audiovisual works; or 
(C) is a second or subsequent offense under either of subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) 
of this section, where a prior offense involved a sound recording, or a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work; 
(2) shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than two 
years, or both, if the offense—, 
(A) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one–hundred–and–
eighty–day period, of more than one hundred but less than one thousand 
phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright in one or more sound 
recordings; or 
(B) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one–hundred–and–
eighty–day period, of more than seven but less than sixty–five copies infringing 
the copyright in one or more motion pictures or other audiovisual works; and 
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(3) shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than one 
year, or both, in any other case…(1982 Act). 
 
. Amazingly, someone who was guilty of copying as few as seven videotapes 
could be fined as much as $25,000 each, and can spend up to one year in jail. This 
provision was enforced against a number of college students that simply copied movies 
for personal use. Clearly a violation of copyright law, but fines of $25,000? One year in 
jail? In this instance, the 1982 act was passed at the behest of the recording industry in 
America. They were determined to protect their financial interests. Interestingly enough, 
the same industry, recording industry in America battled and lost one of the major cases 
that would define the era. In the case of Sony Corporation of America versus Universal 
City Studios Incorporated, 464 US 417 (1984), Universal Studios attempted to force Sony 
to remove Betamax players from the market. Universal City Studios along with other 
recording industry executives and companies claimed that Sony's Betamax recorder was 
designed specifically to violate their copyrights and copyright protected music and 
videos. Sony countered that the Betamax player had other non-infringing uses and that 
simply because it had the capacity to copy videos did not make it illegal. In a landmark 
ruling in 1984 the United States Supreme Court agreed with Sony. They reversed the 
Court of Appeals that had held that Sony was liable for contributory infringement of 
copyrights. The court indicated that there was a significant likelihood that free television 
programs and other recordable events could be recorded that would allow consumers to 
time shift their watching habits and that this was not a violation of copyright law. The 
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Sonly Betamax case is what opened the door for home recording of music, videos and 
other media. 
 New acts in 1992 and 1997 addressed the problem related to the new digital 
environment. The 1997 act became known as the NET act, and increased potential fines 
to as much as $100,000 with penalties as much as one year in prison. The last act passed 
by Congress is known as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). This 1998 act 
raises the stakes significantly. First-time offenders can be fined as much as $500,000 and 
imprisoned for five years or both. For repeat offenders the maximum penalty is $1 
million and maximum time in prison up to 10 years, or both (DMCA). The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act was Congress’ attempt to catch up with the new digital 
environment. The act also incorporates and implements the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty. This 
all-pervasive act, dealt with not only recording industry concerns, but also the burgeoning 
computer industry. By the passage of this act, many were aware that we were living in an 
entirely new age of computers and computer technology. Notwithstanding this awareness, 
Congress never did fully grasp, as probably most people did not, how ubiquitous 
computer based technology would become in our everyday lives. The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) was quite broad at the time of its passage. It did not take long for 
the problems associated with digital media, and the brave new digital world to outpace 
the confines of the act. Notwithstanding the warp speed that new inventions were 
permeating society, The DMCA did accomplish some noteworthy goals. One of the most 
important provisions of the DMCA are the safe harbor provisions for online service 
providers. The safe harbor provision allows online service providers to not be held liable 
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for allegedly infringing material provided that they follow certain guidelines. If they 
operate within these guidelines, and either promptly remove or block access to allegedly 
infringing material in a timely fashion when they've received notification of infringement 
claim from a copyright holder, they will avoid liability as a company (DMCA). 
Ironically, this provision of the DMCA codifies what ultimately case law begin to 
conclude before the law was passed.  The Internet turned copyright law on its head. Prior 
to Internet law, copyright law placed the onus of compliance with copyright provisions 
on the infringer. The law had positive proscriptions indicating that certain behavior was 
illegal or improper under copyright law. It was left up to the potential infringer to avoid 
such conduct. A number of cases, primarily led by Google’s parent company, Alphabet, 
Incorporated, led the fight to allow Internet service providers to provide Internet content 
irrespective of potential copyright violations. The notion that someone, or their agent, 
holding a copyright have the responsibility to notify Internet Service Providers (ISPs) of 
infringing conduct is a new development in copyright law. The DMCA sets the new 
paradigm into statutory law. To the extent that the DMCA picks up where the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 left off, we now have some degree of consistency 
in how electronic communications are construed. The missing link and remaining 
connections relate to how digital privacy should be affected by these changes. 
5.2.3 Patent Law History 
The first patent act was passed in 1790. This act allowed patents for “any art, 
manufacture, engine, machine or device,” (1790 Patent Act). According to one scholar, 
the American Patent Act of 1790 was “the first statutory enactment by any country 
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obligating any form of examination to determine whether a patent should be granted,” 
(Walterscheld, American Patent Law and Admin., 1997). Walterscheld goes on to 
indicate that the idea of absolute novelty was a uniquely American idea. England as well 
as the Italian City States did not insist on absolute novelty, only newness to the particular 
area where the practice was being introduced. The 1790 act required actual novelty, 
(Walterscheld, American Patent Law and Admin., 1997) Just a few years later in 1793 
the act was amended to include “composition of matter, “as well as to impose a 
registration system akin to the British system in lieu of examination, (Walterscheld, and 
1793 Act). Patent law statutory history is quite short as compared to copyright law 
statutory history. The 1952 statute amended the 1793 act and laid out what would become 
the scheme for patent protection since that time. Under the 1952 act, eligibility for a 
patent requires four things. Utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and sufficiency of 
disclosure, (1952 Act). The vast majority of activity regarding patent law has been within 
the court system. One of the major topics of historical disagreement has been what has 
been called “the Jeffersonian story of patent law.” According to advocates of this school 
of thought, patent law grants a special monopoly privilege to a few not justifiable under 
concepts of natural philosophy. The idea behind this notion is that Congress passed the 
Sherman act making monopolies illegal, yet somehow or another people with a patent are 
able to have a monopoly. This concept had been buttressed by statements from Supreme 
Court justices in their opinions which seemed to support this notion. Other scholars tend 
to disagree with that theoretical paradigm and postulate that patents are nothing more 
than property rights, (Mossoff, Cornell Law Rev., 2007) 
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The America Invents Act (Leahy-Smith Act) presented wholesale changes to the 
US Patent system by changing from a first to invent to a first to file system in harmony 
with the rest of the world, (Leahy-Smith Act, 2011). 
5.2.4 Alternative Theories Pertaining to the Origins of Intellectual Property Law 
There are a number of theoretical articles about the origins of intellectual property 
law. One author discusses these origins as “Origin Myth” or “Origin Stories.” (Silbey, 
Geo. Mason L. Rev.,2008). The author discusses such myths as what he calls the 
“creation myth” and indicates that our notions of property rights in the Intellectual 
Property area are deeply rooted in those theories from childhood. Other scholars trace our 
patent system to the Statute of Monopolies passed in England in 1623. This statute 
codified what had been the practice for quite some time in England, namely the practice 
of granting to merchants what are called limited term monopoly rights for either new 
inventions or importers of new trade, (Walterscheid, Pat. And Trademark Office, 1997). 
Walterscheid indicates that the custom of granting limited term monopoly privileges 
actually dates back to the Italian City states of the fourteenth and fifteenth century. 
Although I cannot specifically address the earliest adoption of patent type protections, it 
is my theory that there is an even earlier example of copyright protection than some of 
the earliest theories I have seen proposed. This origin is contained in Exodus 20:4 which 
reads, “Thou shall not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that 
is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.” 
(Exodus 20:4 KJV) While many scholars would indicate that this is only a prohibition 
against idolatry, a closer analysis would indicate that while it is clearly a prohibition 
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against idolatry, there is also the prohibition of a “graven image.” This prohibition of 
creating a “graven image”  would arguably be the first “Copyright Act.” This prohibition 
against graven images is clearly due in part to the claim made in Genesis 20:11 that “For 
in six days the lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the 
seventh day:” In short, this “copyright” prohibition says “I made it all, it’s mine, and you 
shall not copy it by any graven image or likeness thereof.” Most biblical scholars would 
indicate that the book of Exodus, also known by the Jewish nation as the part of the 
Torah and by later Christians as part of the Pentateuch, was written by the biblical 
character Moses sometime around the 5th Century B.C. Although the date is certainly in 
dispute, the general timeframe of the authorship of the book is pretty well agreed upon. 
Whenever the book of Exodus was written, it appears to be before any other works 
claiming to espouse copyright or any other intellectual property right. 
Parenthetically, the right to privacy also has deep roots. As mentioned earlier, 
Harvard Law Review recognized the existence of that right back in 1890. If we go back 
to the Declaration of Independence, the document memorializes the idea of “Life, 
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” One thing is certain—without privacy there can 
be no liberty! Liberty demands that a person has the right to live their life how they 
choose without interference. The idea that a government or business or anyone else can 
compromise your privacy without consequences is farcical. To many, liberty is a God-
given right. If it is inalienable, then privacy is equally important to protect and assert the 
right to liberty. 
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5.2.5 Other Theories of Law 
Much has been written about which theoretical paradigm is at play when 
discussing Intellectual Property Law. I attempt to avoid the traditional arguments and to 
go in a different direction. We can start this analysis by looking at the theories of Donald 
Black regarding the nature, purpose and effect of law. Donald Black asserts in his book 
“The Behavior of Law” that “law is governmental social control,” (Black, 1976). The 
more social control you have in any particular area, the less need for laws to regulate 
behavior. Many people are controlled by their personal relationships. Whether these 
relationships revolve around church attendance, social networks, or family relationships, 
there are some informal controls that help to assure that individuals behave in compliance 
with social norms. In the absence of these informal social controls, formal laws and rules 
are necessary. Black sees this relationship as inverse. The more social control the less law 
needed. Where there is very little social control, more law is needed, (Black, 1976).. 
Donald Black further looks at concepts of stratification as helping to explain the 
relationship between law and individuals. He defines stratification as inequality of 
wealth. He states in his book that law varies directly with stratification. More 
stratification, the greater need for law. Less stratification, a lesser need for law, (Black, 
1976). 
Black further postulates that “people with less wealth have less law.” That is to 
say, according to Black, people that can afford lawyers and can afford to influence 
politicians have endless points of law on their side. The poor on the other hand, have laws 
that are stacked against them. Because they cannot influence the political process the 
laws that are passed are antithetical to their best interest” (Black, 1976). 
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Donald Black goes on to demonstrate that law is directional. Upward law versus 
downward law. Downward law is quite penal in its approach and effect. Donald Black 
continues his analysis by looking at culture. Less culture, more law. More culture, less 
law. According to Black, this relationship is curvilinear. What this means is that laws less 
likely at the extremes where there is little or no cultural diversity. These outliers do not 
necessarily have the same issues as the case is in the middle (Black, 1976). 
In general terms, if we take what Donald Black says in his book as true, then the 
poor are subjected to more laws than the rich, resulting in the loss of liberty and privacy. 
The impact of these laws have a far greater detriment to individuals towards the lower 
end of social stratification. Individuals with greater wealth would be far more insulated 
from laws and the impact these laws would have in their lives. Further, access to the legal 
system would be greater for those who have more resources than those that do not. 
Another author, G. William Domhoff, has written a number of books dealing with 
corporate and class dominance. One of his books “Who Rules America,” looks at how 
power and influence have a lasting and major impact on society, (Domhoff, 2010). 
The book specifically deals with what Domhoff and other social scientists call 
“The Power Elite.” The power elite are made of members of society that by virtue of their 
money, influence, connections and friendships, they dominate the functions and 
operations of government and industry, (Domhoff, 2010). By virtue of this inordinate 
amount of power, this group has an outsized influence on laws, rules and regulations in 
American society. The power elite typically attend some of the same Ivy League 
institutions and are socially connected. Domhoff and other social scientists refer to the 
“policy planning network.” This group of individuals by virtue of their status as the 
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power elite also have inordinate control over foundations, think tanks, policy discussion 
groups, and the business Roundtable, (Domhoff, 2010). The book “Who Rules America” 
is just one book that supports these theories. The idea of the power elite and the idea of 
policy planning networks is well-established in social sciences literature. The Domhoff  
book is in its seventh edition, and has been available continuously in the United States 
and some edition or another for the past 50 plus years.  
The ideas that are postulated are not considered to be fringe ideas or out of the 
mainstream social science thought. The idea of the power elite is a well-accepted 
mainline social science paradigm. Many scholars trace conflict theory back to the 
writings of Karl Marx. While it is true that Marx proposed a conflict theory paradigm, 
today's scholars that subscribe to conflict theory are a long way from anything that could 
remotely be called socialist theory. The immediate question we have to deal with is how 
do conflict theories impact intellectual property law? Is there a relationship? Do these 
theories help to explain why the law may be the way it is? I intend to demonstrate that 
these theories underlie the very basis of why law is passed and how it became law. If we 
go back to the first CopyrightAact of 1897 that imposed criminal sanctions, it is clear that 
the only individuals that were directly affected by the criminal portions of the act were 
typically transient and without financial means. This is certainly not a coincidence. The 
law specifically singled out “public performances” as being worthy of special attention. 
This era was before the abundance of recorded musical and video media, so the idea of 
copyright violations involving electronic duplication of protected works was limited to 
those of financial means. The large commercial studios had the capability to duplicate 
and distribute protected works. These studios were ultimately dominated by a few large 
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companies such as Walt Disney, 20th Century Fox and Warner Brothers. Why single out 
public performances? Although the argument can be made that a movie or musical 
production would be a public performance, the record does not indicate that this is what 
the law had in mind. It is clear from the language of the act, as well as enforcement 
mechanisms used for the next few decades that the idea of public performances related to 
live performances by actors and musicians. From the very origins of copyright criminal 
law, a class of individuals were singled out that generally were not members of the elite 
power structure in society. 
It is clear from the early literature that the idea of infringing on someone's 
intellectual property rights was considered theft. The ECPA also considers taking 
someone’s private digital property theft. A look at Black's Law dictionary definition of 
theft would indicate that theft is a “felonious taking and removing of another's personal 
property with the intent of depriving the true owner of it.” (Black’s). A theoretical 
problem immediately arises when concepts of theft are applied to intellectual property 
law violations. For example, in the case of a musical composition, how does the public 
performance of that composition deprive the true owner of the composition? While there 
may be an infringement, there does not appear to be a deprivation. Both parties can 
mutually have access to the musical performance and musical score simultaneously. The 
infringers use of the musical composition does not deprive the true owners right to also 
play and use the composition. This lack of deprivation makes intellectual property theft, 
at least in the case of copyright, different from other types of theft where the true owner 
is fully deprived of the use of their property. Thus the term infringement. To whatever 
extent Congress decided that infringement is the same as theft, the dissimilarities became 
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unimportant. Because Congress has the right to proscribe and forbid certain behaviors, 
theoretical notions of theft do not necessarily have to deter Congress from acting. It 
obviously did not. Notwithstanding the differences between theft of personal property 
versus infringement of intellectual property, Congress saw fit, only in the case of 
copyright, to criminalize the latter.  
The real question that arises from this fact pattern is why did Congress decide to 
criminalize public performances versus other violations of intellectual property law? 
When looking at the theoretical paradigms that come to play, as mentioned earlier, by 
theories regarding the power elite, and theories about the “haves and the have-nots,” it 
becomes more clear that the statutes criminalizing intellectual property law copyright 
infringement were specifically designed to accomplish the very thing it appears they were 
intended to accomplish. Vis-à-vis to impose a harsh criminal penalty on performers and 
actors for their public performances. Some scholars attempt to trace this theoretical shift 
from civil penalties only to criminal penalties to the fact that intellectual property 
continued to grow in value as opposed to real and personal property. This certainly would 
be quite true for the latter part of the 20th century. The real question to answer, is 
whether that was actually true in 1897. In 1897, as mentioned before, only a few wealthy 
individuals had the capability to actually record and disseminate protected intellectual 
property works. These wealthy individuals controlled the fledgling film, book publishing, 
and music industry. Why would Congress pass an act that largely ignores the potentially 
bigger problem of mass infringement, versus the relatively minor problem of public 
performance infringement?  
91 
 
I am not suggesting that Congress needed a crystal ball to foresee into the future 
the rapid growth and development of media production companies. Enough evidence 
existed in 1897 for Congress to understand the difference between protecting the interests 
of large corporate and financial behemoths, versus protecting the interests of generally, 
most commonly, smalltime local performers. It is not too much to infer that Congress was 
neither naïve nor misinformed as to who the act would apply to primarily. This is further 
made clear by the adoption of the 1909 act which broadens the impact of the criminal 
sanctions to cover aiding and abetting, (1909 Act). In making the decision to differentiate 
which types of copyright violations would be subject to criminal penalty, Congress 
showed a clear preference for protecting one type of rights over others. Congress always 
has the right to pass whatever laws it deems appropriate, even if these laws 
disproportionately affect the poor. 
5.2.6 The Absence of Criminal Sanctions for Patent Violations 
While the history of criminal sanctions can be traced from its misdemeanor 
origins for copyright law to ever increasing fines and longer sentences for copyright 
violators, the absence of any corresponding criminal penalty or sanction for patent law 
violations is quite stark. When we consider the fact that the first misdemeanor criminal 
sanction for copyright violations was passed in 1897, why is it that nearly 120 years later, 
no criminal sanctions have been passed regarding patent violations? The idea of criminal 
sanctions for patent violations are not completely novel. The European Union considered 
such sanctions when they recently updated their intellectual property laws. Ultimately, 
they decided not to impose cruel sanctions for patent violations. When looking at the 
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impact to society for patent violations versus copyright violations, many argue that 
copyright violations have a larger impact. It may be true that more people are involved in 
copyright violations. That is not the same as saying that the impact is larger for copyright 
violations. Most recently in the news, many should be aware of what have been termed as 
the “smart phone patent wars.”  
The major lawsuits in these wars have been between Apple Computer 
Incorporated and Samsung Electronics Company, Limited. These multimillion dollar 
battles involve billions of dollars in profits and fees. Apple has claimed that Samsung has 
violated its patents that makes it iPhones unique. On the other hand, Samsung has made 
the same claim about its smartphones. In this battle fought on multiple continents,  Apple 
has won in some courts and Samsung has won in other courts. One thing is certain; there 
are billions of dollars at stake in the litigation. It seems obvious on its face that someone 
at one or both of these companies must assume some responsibility for the intentional 
violation of patent protections.  It is inconceivable that corporate executives at Apple or 
corporate executives at Samsung are totally unaware of any infringing activities by their 
companies. After the millions of dollars spent in litigation, numerous depositions, 
interrogatories and discovery requests, can we logically presume that everyone at either 
of both companies just innocently, and unknowingly infringed on the others patent 
rights? This is next to impossible to fathom. Engineers, technologists, and other 
employees have to have some awareness where they got the ideas or technology that 
forms the basis for these lawsuits. With this much evidence in existence, how hard would 
it be to mount some sort of criminal investigation that held some of the parties criminally 
liable for their behavior? Theories that purport to write off the possibility of patent 
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criminal liability based on the difficulty of prosecution are misguided. If given the 
statutory authority to proceed with criminal prosecutions, there are some industrious 
prosecutors that would quickly build solid criminal cases going after some of the worst 
and most flagrant offenders. 
In the last 10 years or so, the United States has embarked upon a relative 
paradigm shift in how corporations are treated. The Supreme Court has on a number of 
occasions indicated that corporations are in fact people. They've indicated that 
corporations have rights, duties and obligations stemming from their citizenship as 
people. In one such case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310 
(2010), the Supreme Court held that companies and unions could spend as much as they 
like in elections to defeat political candidates. The decision essentially recognized First 
Amendment free speech rights for corporations. The Supreme Court as well as lower 
courts have begun to impose corporate criminal liability on not only corporations but also 
individually on corporate officers. This new theoretical paradigm posits that those who 
run corporations must personally be liable for the behavior of those corporations to assure 
that these businesses fulfill all of its obligations to stakeholders. Although the idea of 
corporate criminal liability is not entirely new, its imposition to officers and directors has 
evolved in recent times, (Dodd-Frank, 2002). After a number of corporate scandals, as 
well is corporate failures, the United States passed what became known as the Dodd-
Frank Act. This act specifically provides that officers and directors of a corporation are 
charged with the responsibility of knowing what is happening in those businesses. Failure 
to understand what's going on, when you are in a position of leadership, is not an excuse 
for avoiding criminal liability. The Dodd-Frank Act specifically imposes liability on 
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these officers and directors who are in a position to know what the business is doing, or 
failing to do (Dubber, Nev. Crim. L. Rev., 2013). 
Why is their duplicity in liability for corporate officers and directors when it 
comes to patent infringement but clear liability when it comes to other kinds of corporate 
misconduct? On the one hand, Dodd-Frank imposes civil and criminal liability to these 
officers and directors that violate financial, disclosure, and/or ethical rules and 
regulations. Patent infringement is like the 800-pound gorilla in the room. The fact that 
Apple and Samsung are involved in over 50 lawsuits with each other regarding patent 
infringement gives us some sense as to how important these issues are and the real scope 
of potential violations. Most analysts would indicate that the potential loss to business for 
patent infringement approaches billions of dollars. Although the estimates are all over the 
board, they are all in the billions. That being said, it is difficult to justify why a college 
student that downloads ten songs without permission is subject to criminal prosecution, 
but an executive of a major corporation can supervise the theft of billions of dollars in 
protected patent property, and face no criminal sanctions whatsoever. Under the ECPA, 
persons that steal satellite TV or cable signals are criminally prosecuted for their 
electronic theft/ How could this possibly be fair? Many have tried to argue that the reason 
why there are no criminal sanctions in patent law is because it will be difficult to prove 
criminal liability. There certainly may be some truth as to the complexity of patent law, 
but as demonstrated earlier, that is not an excuse for not having protections and sanctions 
in place for obvious violators. 
Let us take a look at the patent process to make some reasoned judgments as to 
whether or not criminal liability can be imposed for infringers. In a successful patent 
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prosecution (the term prosecution is used to refer to obtaining a patent) certain things 
must occur. First, the inventor must describe the invention in writing. Second, the 
application must" enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains… To make and 
use" an invention. Third, a claim has to be clear and concise. Fourth, the inventor must" 
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." 
(Mendez, Buff. Intel Prop., 2008). If the Patent Office, and courts that review patent 
decisions, can engage in this deep level of analysis, why should we be concerned that 
other specially trained lawyers and paralegals cannot navigate successfully any potential 
pitfalls with successful criminal prosecution? 
United States patent law as currently configured prohibits" whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United 
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the 
patent therefore, infringes the patent." (35 USC) 
Many argue that prosecuting patent infringers would be too difficult. The reasons 
given are that the criminal courts are not qualified to deal with these patent issues. This 
argument suggests that patent issues are so complex that judges would not be able to 
understand what's going on. If that is true then there should not be any civil violations for 
patent infringement. Just like civil judges have to learn the particulars of patent law, so 
criminal law judges would have to learn new things. Certainly, a successful defense to 
patent infringement would be the invalidation of the patent. It is quite clear that 
prosecutors would have to use reasonable judgment in which patent infringers they go 
after. This level of discretion is not new to prosecutors. Exercising discretion as to whom 
they should prosecute is part and parcel of what prosecutors do every day. Why would 
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making that assessment in a patent case be any different than the assessment that 
prosecutors make in any case? In a case that is a close call, prosecutors would certainly 
have the discretion not to bring criminal charges. They have that discretion now. What 
about the clear and obvious violations? Once again, I go to the analogy of a college 
student that downloads 10 copies of protected music illegally. The student is prosecuted 
for and convicted of criminal copyright infringement.  
On the same campus, a professor in one of the university discovery parks, 
intentionally steals protected patented information and ideas from another company. The 
professor understands fully that these inventions are patented. With full intention of 
wrongdoing, the professor infringes on the patent and improperly incorporates the 
patented invention into a product for his own startup company. The way the law stands 
right now, the student goes to prison, while the professor goes home to dinner!  How 
could that possibly be fair?  
Complexity is not in and of itself a sufficient grounds to allow this disparity to 
continue to access. Another reason given for why patents should not be part of criminal 
law violations is because some say it is not possible for law enforcement officers to 
determine whether or not a patent violation has occurred. (United States Code: Title 35 -  
Patents, Part II). 
Other reasons given are that patent litigation is expensive, and that a significant 
portion of patents are revoked in the course of patent litigation. (United States Code: Title 
35 -  Patents, Part II). Once again, simply because prosecutors face a difficult job, should 
not be an excuse for corporate criminals, and other violators, to violate the law of patents, 
and to use another person’s invention intentionally, potentially making millions or 
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billions of dollars in the process, without any criminal liability whatsoever. Complicated 
trials for criminal behavior have become a part and parcel of the American landscape. 
Once again, complicated trials have become commonplace in the era of Dodd-Frank. In 
many ways we have to look at another theory for criminal justice and criminology to 
really see what's going on. Edward Sutherland postulated way back in the 1960s a new 
concept of criminal liability. He coined the term “white-collar crime".  
Edward Sutherland used this phrase to refer to criminals that may be educated, 
and are almost always financially well-off, and can wreak havoc in society by stealing 
from and misusing corporate assets with impunity, (Friedrichs, 2004). It is still a common 
occurrence in the United States for someone that might be guilty of stealing a few 
hundred dollars’ worth of goods from the local grocery store to be sentenced to more 
time in prison then a corporate executive that may have stolen millions of dollars 
including retirees’ life savings. There is no question that the imbalance has improved 
over the last 20 years. Notwithstanding the improvement, it is still common that white-
collar criminals are treated with kid gloves as compared to the street criminal that 
likewise did no physical harm to the victim. 
The only real explanation that gets to the very heart of why people with power, 
money, prestige, and connections can avoid criminal liability has to do with a conflict 
perspective. Although there are different theories as to why these white-collar criminals 
are able to steal millions of dollars’ worth of patented material, none of the theories adds 
up without looking at the conflict perspective, and power perspectives.  
Only when you analyze how laws are passed and the influence of political action 
committees as well as lobbyists in the political process can you reach a conclusion that a 
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person guilty of knowingly and intentionally stealing millions of dollars does not face 
criminal prosecution but an individual guilty of stealing a few dollars can go to prison for 
quite some time. Theories that have been postulated so far, including a conflict 
perspective, the power elite, and policy planning networks helps to account and explain 
this anomaly. The fact that there have been numerous successful prosecutions in other 
areas of IP law undercuts any notion that criminal prosecution in the area of patent law 
would be too difficult.  
Some examples of other areas of IP law where criminal law violations have been 
successfully launched include the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. This act imposes 
criminal and civil penalties for the theft of trade secrets. The law was originally passed 
because of a high level of concern that foreign companies were attacking American 
businesses with electronic theft of important information, (Am. Crim. L. Rev.). The act 
defines trade secret as information that has “derived independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable 
through proper means by the public.” (Am. Crim. L. Rev.) The act further imposes the 
requirement that the owner has to take reasonable steps to keep the information private.  
(Am. Crim. L. Rev.) The Economic Espionage act also requires that the “theft of trade 
secrets benefits a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.” (Am. Crim. L. Rev.).  
Prior to adoption of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, another act existed that 
also deals with trade secrets. The “Trade Secrets Act” (TSA) deals with the unauthorized 
disclosure of government information by employees.  
 The idea that Patent Violations are immune from criminal prosecution is 
inconsistent with the entire notion of protection of individual and corporate privacy, 
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property and intellectual property rights. The entire movement in the area of rights 
protection seeks to find ways to buttress protection of rights. (Am. Crim. L. Rev.). 
5.2.7 The Relationship between the Protection of Electronic Communication and 
Protection of Digital or Electronic Intellectual Property Rights 
Today, courts disagree on what the constitutional protections may be relative to 
electronic communications and surveillance as well as how to protect electronic 
intellectual property rights or digital privacy rights.  United States Circuit Courts have 
split on whether their decisions should expand digital privacy rights or limit digital 
privacy rights.  Both of these scenarios pose a question implicating how fourth 
amendment protections will be analyzed and implemented. What is clear to even a casual 
observer is that if digital privacy rights are at risk in general, than digital privacy rights 
coupled with valuable intellectual property rights are also at risk.  In order to ascertain the 
efficacy of legal protections today, it is necessary to compare the protections in existence 
today with protections in the past.  
This analysis will gauge the status of protection afforded electronic 
communications today with the protection levels of electronic and non-electronic 
communications in bygone decades. If the protection levels are the same, and courts are 
enforcing modern-day electronic communications protections in the same manner that 
non-electronic communications were protected in the past, than the case law history from 
the past can help to inform us as to what we can expect in the future. If not, then this new 
electronic frontier has ushered in a new era that creates a disjunctive from some of the 
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common law precedents of the past. If various types of communication common today in 
the expanded electronic world do not enjoy the same level of protection that 
communications, electronic and non-electronic, had in the past, then we can see that the 
law has lagged behind the advancements in communications technology leaving 
electronic communication rights, associated data security rights, electronic intellectual 
property rights and most notably, digital privacy rights vulnerable and unprotected. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
Many proposals have been made as to how best to protect Americans 
constitutional privacy rights. The root of the problem stems from a basic reality. The 
founding fathers never really contemplated digital privacy rights per se. They certainly 
understood in the fourth amendment that citizens should be “secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects.” Looking at the history of how the United States Supreme 
Court found that privacy was a right that emanated from the penumbras of rights as 
contained in the Bill of Rights, indicates that we have a judicially mandated concept that 
is subject to interpretation and change. A recent look at the make-up of the Supreme 
Court demonstrates how this right, particularly of digital privacy, still exists at the whim 
of the courts.  
Presently there are only eight members sitting on the Supreme Court, after the 
death of Justice Antonin Scalia. Most recently, in a case before the court, regarding 
funding of public unions, the court split with a four to four tie. It is pretty clear from that 
situation that we are at a stage in our history when the Supreme Court could become 
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more conservative or more liberal. Who is to say that the earlier rulings, even finding that 
there is a right to privacy, are sacrosanct. There is a political battle going on in 
Washington DC as I write the final chapter of this dissertation where the Republican-
controlled Senate refuses to act upon the Supreme Court justice nomination of President 
Obama. I obviously do not have a crystal ball, and cannot predict how this impasse will 
be played out. If the Senate GOP leadership continues to insist that they will not hold any 
hearings whatsoever on the presidential nominee, this seat could be made vacant until 
after the 2016 elections. If that is the case, the direction of the Supreme Court will be 
seriously impacted by whomever wins the 2016 election. If a conservative wins, we can 
expect that the court will end up with a conservative nominee and ultimately a 
conservative justice. If a liberal wins, we can expect that the court most likely will end up 
with a more liberal nominee and ultimately more liberal justice.  
Although it is not always clear how conservatives or liberals may view privacy 
rights, American’s digital privacy rights should not be contingent upon who is nominated 
and confirmed to the Supreme Court. There was no way in the constitutional convention 
of the late 1700s that our founding fathers could have foreseen the radical transformation 
of our society. Electricity, indoor plumbing, automobiles, airplanes, radio, televisions, 
telephones, cellular phones, and a whole host of inventions had not even been dreamed of 
by that time. From time to time, the American people have recognized that the 
Constitution needed updating to reflect the changes to modern society. It is ironic that the 
most recent amendment to the Constitution became effective on May 7, 1992. This 
amendment was submitted by Congress to the states for ratification way back in 1789. 
The amendment is quite simple and states, “no law, bearing the compensation for the 
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services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of 
representatives shall have intervened.” (United States Constitution, Amendment 27, 
1992). 
 When this amendment was first submitted to the states for ratification the idea of 
privacy rights didn’t even exist. By the time it was ratified in 1992, the need for privacy 
rights, particularly digital privacy right was quite apparent. 
Today, in 2016, Americans expectations of digital privacy have significant and 
important dimensions. Violations of digital privacy rights, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, 
not only emanates from the government, but even to a greater extent from big business. 
Additionally, individuals, can violate a person’s digital privacy rights, and wreck-havoc 
in a victim’s life. Some of the examples, as mentioned, include sportscaster Erin Andrews 
and how her life was drastically changed by an invasion of her privacy by a private 
individual. In this electronic age, privacy rights, and particularly digital privacy rights are 
far more important than simply being secure against unlawful searches and seizures and 
the body of law developed to protect physical property. 
When the fourth amendment indicates that, “the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized,” it was language for a different time and era as it relates to digital 
privacy rights. It was brilliant language, no doubt, but antiquated language that was 
addressed at physical searches, and not at all aimed at electronic and digital privacy. The 
idea of probable cause being necessary before the government can enter your house or 
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business, go through your papers and effects, is certainly a valuable protection. 
Unfortunately, it is not enough to protect digital privacy rights. Digital privacy rights, are 
far more important to our security as a people than the traditional notions of unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Probable cause is one of the lowest standards recognized in law. 
Although it is certainly greater than articulable suspicion, not by much. As indicated in 
earlier chapters, the United States Supreme Court articulated what probable cause means 
in the case of Brinegar v. United States (338 U.S. 160). The court implemented the two-
pronged test in Aguilar v Texas, (378 U.S. 108) in 1964 and abandoned that test in 1983 
in favor of a “totality of Circumstances” test in the case of Illinois v Gates (462 U.S. 
213). This new totality of circumstances test rejected the stronger two-pronged test. In a 
dissenting opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshal indicate that the new test allows for 
dishonest and unreliable testimony to support a probable cause affidavit that will severely 
impact the rights of those that have not committed a crime. 
In short, the privacy rights, particularly digital privacy rights, of Americans are 
hinged upon whether or not justices that authored the decision in Illinois v Gates, sits on 
the Supreme Court, or whether or not justices that are sensitive to digital privacy rights 
have control of the Supreme Court. The reality that existed in 1983 still exists today. 
Americans’ digital privacy rights can literally be expanded or contracted depending on 
the ideological perspective of the five justices who make up the majority of the court. 
Digital privacy rights, in 2016, need far more protection than happenstance. Americans 
need protections not only from the government but also from private actors. The 
judicially created concept of privacy is insufficient to protect these important digital 
privacy rights in our complex technological society as articulated today.  
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This study proposes three separate solutions to this problem. The first solution: 
Judicial Fiat, or adoption of a Clear and Convincing standard for digital privacy rights, by 
court rulings. This is a possible but quite unlikely solution. In an era where many justices 
have shown a reluctance towards judicial activism it is quite unlikely for the court on its 
own to change course that radically midstream. It certainly is possible, but highly 
unlikely.  The second solution to the problem of digital privacy rights for American 
citizens is to seek, and successfully implement a constitutional amendment that 
unequivocally protects Americans digital privacy rights. Any such amendment, would 
need to abandon, the easily manipulated idea of probable cause.  
A more robust standard should exist for violation of an individual’s digital 
privacy rights. I propose that a higher judicial standard known as “clear and convincing 
evidence,” should apply to this new constitutional amendment. It is important, to limit the 
abundance of litigation that would result from a new constitutional amendment to 
articulate a standard that is already well known. There is a significant body of law around 
the clear and convincing evidence standard. Because this body of law already exists, the 
amount of litigation resulting from the new constitutional amendment would be limited. 
As indicated in an earlier chapter, as recently as 2011 the United States Supreme Court 
unanimously upheld the concept of clear and convincing evidence. The case was a patent 
law case. In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership. The court held that in all patent 
infringement cases, and accused infringer must prove that the patent is invalid by clear 
and convincing evidence. This is an interesting ruling because it essentially says that a 
business that owns a patent has a substantial court protected constitutionally protected 
right to that property, and that anyone who wants to invalidate that protected right, must 
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do so with clear and convincing evidence. Why should the digital privacy rights of 
everyday citizens, businesses, and other entities, be afforded any less protection? A 
digital privacy amendment will assure that the rights of everyday citizens to be protected 
in their electronic security, should be at least as great as a corporation’s right to be 
protected from patent infringers. 
A proposed digital privacy amendment would read as follows: 
The right to digital privacy shall be vigorously protected. Anyone or any entity 
that collects personal data must protect the data from misuse. Personal data shall not be 
sold or disseminated without permission of the individual or entity affected. Governments 
(federal or state) may not access personal electronic data, without a warrant issued by a 
competent court. For a court to issue a warrant allowing access to electronic data, the 
party seeking the warrant shall demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the 
party whose information is sought has committed or is committing a crime. In 
circumstances where a government entity (state or federal) seeks to compel a service 
provider to disclose a user’s private communications or documents, in any form, a 
warrant shall be obtained based on “clear and convincing evidence.” Any government 
entity (state or federal) that seeks to track the location of any mobile communication 
device or obtain transactional data, by means of any communications technology, shall 
first obtain a warrant issued upon “clear and convincing evidence” of the commission of 
a crime by the individual whose information is sought. Individuals, business entities and 
other organizations are also prohibited from violating digital privacy rights of any 
individual or entity. Violations of the provisions of this amendment shall result in severe 
penalties as established by Congress. It shall also be a felony to intentionally violate this 
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amendment. Congress may enact other criminal and civil sanctions to effectuate the goals 
of this amendment. 
This solution would certainly solve much of the problem. Raising the standard to 
“Clear and Convincing” evidence would establish a very high bar to government 
encroachment of digital privacy rights. Assuring that businesses and individuals face 
certain punishment by the loss of finances or the loss of liberty would serve as a strong 
deterrent to violation of digital privacy rights. The problem with the solution of course is 
the extreme difficulty in which it takes to amend the Constitution. As mentioned earlier 
the 27th amendment took 203 years to be ratified by the states. The equal rights 
amendment, as simple and straightforward as it was, has never been ratified although it 
came close.  However much time it takes to pass such an amendment would be worth the 
effort. 
Another solution to the problem of digital privacy rights in America, is the most 
practical solution. Congress could, with the president’s approval, simply pass statutory 
language almost identical to the digital privacy amendment language above. Obviously, a 
statutory scheme should include a much more robust indication of penalties for violations 
and potential fines. A statutory scheme would be more comprehensive. But the salient 
feature, would be the adoption of a “clear and convincing” standard for the issuance of 
warrants, and/or the access of private data. Many would argue that such a standard would 
hamper law enforcement. This is doubtful in that law enforcement has always shown a 
resilient capability to find and prosecute criminals. Although the United States makes up 
approximately 4% of the world’s population, we incarcerate 25% of the world’s 
prisoners. The argument that says that law enforcement would be hampered has no 
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support in the evidentiary record.  More importantly, fragile digital privacy rights of 
American citizens would be adequately protected. 
One of the things anyone you meet at any prison or jail will tell you, is that the 
loss of privacy is a horrendous loss. When incarcerated, you do not have the ability to 
keep others from watching you, tracking you, and even searching you. The space that you 
live in is open and subject to inspection and unlimited searches and seizures. 
Without privacy there can be no liberty, liberty and privacy are intricately tied 
together. Digital privacy is the most important type of privacy because conceivable much 
more is at stake. Digital privacy also encompasses the ability to be left alone. Without the 
ability to be left alone, a major aspect of liberty is compromised. We all need the ability 
to engage in our own affairs without the involvement of others. Whether this occurs 
inside the home, the workplace, our automobiles, or any other place we may be, it is an 
important right to simply not be bothered. Without digital privacy this right cannot exist. 
Digital privacy must be protected for liberty to thrive. 
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